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Post-election mapping and interaction activities – Estonia

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POLITIKOS – Wir müssen reden!

E-Riigi Akadeemia Sihtasutus

Centre for Economics and Public Administration Ltd

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| Contributors | Jelizaveta Krenjova-Cepilova, PhD Liia Hänni, PhD Kristina Reinsalu, PhD |
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Table of Contents

| | |
|--|----|
| Table of Contents | 3 |
| Table of Figures | 5 |
| Introduction | 7 |
| 1 Post-Election Mapping and Interaction Activities..... | 9 |
| 1.1 Post-Election Survey (Survey II) (10/02/2020 – 09/04/2020) | 9 |
| 1.2 Post-Election Focus Groups (FG II.3. and II.4.) | 10 |
| 1.2.1 First focus group (FG II.3.) (05/12/2019) | 10 |
| 1.2.2 Second focus group (FG II.4.) (23/04/2020) | 12 |
| 1.3 Stakeholder Interviews | 13 |
| 1.3.1 Interviews with political representatives (MEPs) | 13 |
| 1.3.2 Interviews with other stakeholders..... | 15 |
| 1.4 Desk Analysis of Party Electoral Programmes..... | 15 |
| 1.4.1 Selection of the policy topics for the analysis | 16 |
| 2 Key Findings..... | 19 |
| 2.1 Post-Election Survey (Survey II) (10/02/2020 – 09/04/2020) | 19 |
| 2.2 Post-Election Focus Group (FG II.3. and II.4.)..... | 29 |
| 2.2.1 First focus group (FG II.3.) (05/12/2019) | 29 |
| 2.2.2 Second focus group (FG II.4.) (23/04/2020) | 34 |
| 2.3 Stakeholder Interviews | 42 |
| 2.3.1 Interviews with political representatives (MEPs) | 42 |
| 2.3.2 Interviews with other stakeholders..... | 45 |
| 2.4 Desk Analysis of Party Electoral Programmes..... | 50 |
| 2.4.1 Cross-cutting topics..... | 50 |
| 2.4.2 Predominantly presented topics | 51 |
| 2.4.3 Partly overlooked topics | 52 |
| 2.4.4 General Findings..... | 53 |
| 3 Conclusions..... | 54 |
| 3.1 Political apathy | 54 |
| 3.2 Home-country bias | 55 |
| 3.3 Information deficits | 57 |
| 3.4 Communication deficits | 59 |
| 3.5 Administrative barriers..... | 62 |

| | | |
|-----------------|--|----|
| 3.6 | Other topics..... | 64 |
| 3.6.1 | Social integration..... | 64 |
| 3.6.2 | Stakeholders roles and integration recommendations | 64 |
| 3.7 | Summary and future activities | 65 |
| References..... | | 67 |
| Annexes | | 69 |

Table of Figures

| | |
|---|----|
| Figure 1 Focus Group II.3. held on 05.12.2019 in Tallinn | 11 |
| Figure 2 Screenshot capture of the recording of the FG II.4. held virtually on 23.04.2020 | 12 |
| Figure 3 Interview with MEP Marina Kaljurand (Social Democratic Party) | 14 |
| Figure 4 Interview with MEP Urmas Paet (Estonian Reform Party) | 14 |
| Figure 5 Table presenting the results of the European Parliament elections in Estonia | 16 |
| Figure 6 Survey results to the question “Did you vote in the 2019 EP elections?”..... | 19 |
| Figure 7 Survey results to the question “Why did you not vote?” | 19 |
| Figure 8 Survey results to the selection statement “In the 2019 EP elections, did you cast your vote...” | 20 |
| Figure 9 Survey results to the question “Why did you cast your vote for a home-country party/candidate?”..... | 20 |
| Figure 10 Survey results to the use and willingness of use (if available) of I-voting | 21 |
| Figure 11 Survey results to the question “Did you know about the option to cast your vote online (I-voting) in the 2019 EP Elections in Estonia?” | 22 |
| Figure 12 Survey results to the question “Did you know that when you go to live in another EU country you have the choice in EP Elections to vote for a party / candidate from your home country or your host country?” | 22 |
| Figure 13 Survey results to the question “Did you know that you have the right to vote in local government (council / district assembly) elections in your host country while you are living there?”..... | 22 |
| Figure 14 Survey results to the question “Did you follow the political parties' campaigns for the 2019 EP Elections?”..... | 23 |
| Figure 15 Survey results to the question “Indicate the three topics that you consider most important” | 23 |
| Figure 16 Survey results to the question “Are you currently involved in any political, social or civic activity in your host country?” | 24 |
| Figure 17 Survey results to the question “Why are you not getting involved in political, social or civic activities in your host country?” | 24 |
| Figure 18 Survey results to the selection statement “In your own view, do you consider yourself a citizen of...” | 25 |
| Figure 19 Partial survey results to the questions “Were you aware of these platforms? How useful were they to you?” | 25 |
| Figure 20 Survey results to the question “What should be improved, in your view, to encourage young EU citizens like yourself to become more actively engaged in political discussions regarding the EU (through voting in EP elections, and otherwise)?” | 26 |

| | |
|---|----|
| Figure 21 Survey results to the question “What could be improved to encourage young EU citizens who live and study / work abroad to participate more frequently / actively in the political life of their host country (through voting in local elections, and otherwise)?” | 26 |
| Figure 22 Survey results to the question “Are you following news and other sources / channels of public information about a) the EU and b) your host country?” | 27 |
| Figure 23 Survey results to the selection statement “Do your news sources include...” | 27 |
| Figure 24 Survey results to the question “Where, and how, would you like to find information on how to participate in the political, social and civic life of your host country while you are here?” | 28 |
| Figure 25 Survey results to the question “Who could help you best with providing relevant information on EP Elections and other opportunities of engaging at the EU level?” | 28 |
| Figure 26 Survey results to the question “Who could help you best with providing relevant information on local elections and other opportunities of engaging here in Estonia?” | 28 |
| Figure 27 Infographics of the topics in the electoral platforms of Estonian political parties. .. | 51 |

Introduction

The objective of Deliverable 4.5 is to present the implementation process and the preliminary findings of the post-election mapping activities, i.e. activities undertaken after the 2019 European Parliament (EP) elections in Estonia. As the project proposal prescribes, parallel and identical activities were implemented in the project use case countries - Estonia and Austria - by consortium partners (see Deliverable 4.4 for overview of Austrian activities).

The post-election mapping and interaction activities included:

- one post-election online survey among the principle and extended target group;
- two post-election focus groups with the principle and extended target group in Tallinn, Estonia;
- four semi-structured open-ended interviews with the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from Estonia;
- desk analysis of political parties' programmes in Estonia;
- three semi-structured interviews with stakeholders.

As Deliverable 2.1 outlines, the project's **principal target group** consists of mobile EU students in Austria and Estonia, i.e. students from other EU countries who are resident in Austria and Estonia to pursue their academic studies.

However, since the circumstances of students in higher education (such as their motivation for travelling and staying abroad and the time limitation of their stay) are quite specific, the project also seeks to address an **extended target group** of mobile EU citizens who are not university students. The project's extended target group therefore also includes students who attend vocational and professional education; employees on temporary workplace postings abroad; and employees who are posted outside of their home-country permanently.

The post-election mapping activities were conducted based on the methodology developed in Work Package (WP) 2 that was submitted in Deliverable 2.1.

The objective of the post-election survey and focus groups was to deepen and complement the findings of the pre-election mapping exercises. More specifically, these activities aimed to:

- learn about the voting experience of the target groups in the past European Parliament elections;
- better understand the target group's interest in continued engagement in the political life in their host-country, as well as at the EU level, and identify potential obstacles to participation;
- deepen the understanding of the target group's information and communication needs;
- explore suggestions for policy recommendations and specific measures which could be implemented by stakeholders.

The objectives of the interviews with MEPs were threefold:

- Inform MEPs about the project and explain the profile of the target group, its significance and its heterogeneity;
- Find out whether they consider mobile students as their constituency and how important were they to them as a target group in the 2019 European elections;
- See whether they consider the current systems and procedures to be adequate for the needs of this particular target group and whether they have any suggestions for improvement.

The objective of the stakeholder interviews was to (re)establish the connection with the stakeholders, to present the project and its findings, to inquire about the roles of stakeholders to support the integration of EMYs in Estonia, and to conduct in-depth discussion on technical questions of the project in order to obtain first-hand feedback.

1 Post-Election Mapping and Interaction Activities

1.1 Post-Election Survey (Survey II) (10/02/2020 – 09/04/2020)

In accordance with the guidelines and the design and content of the survey provided by WP2, the survey was divided into four sections containing the following topics:

- 1) Theme 1: EU citizenship rights and engagement of the target group in 2019 EP elections
- 2) Theme 2: (Continuous) Participation of the target group in EU and host-country political life
- 3) Theme 3: Information needs and preferred communication channels of the target group
- 4) Theme 4: The role of stakeholders

The post-election survey was conducted online using the [Survey Monkey environment](#) during the time period between the 10th of February and the 9th of April 2020. The online survey was adaptable for completing it on mobile devices. The survey was disseminated through the key stakeholders identified in Deliverable 4.1. The invitation to participate in the survey was sent to the key stakeholders that have direct access to the contacts of the target group and/or manage their social media accounts. More specifically, the invitation was sent to the e-Governance Technologies and Services Programme and Mobility Center of Tallinn Technical University (TalTech); Study Abroad Center and Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies of Tartu University; Academic Affairs Office and School of Governance, Law and Society of Tallinn University. In addition, the survey was posted in the ESN TalTech degree and Erasmus students FB group as well as Expats in Tallinn & Estonia FB group. Also, all respondents of the previous pre-election survey and pre-election focus group participants were invited. The survey was embedded into the EMY website to target as wide public as possible. In addition, the invitation to the post-election survey and the focus group was sent to all eligible EU voters aged 18-29 in Estonia (Annex 2)¹.

Furthermore, the participation in the survey was regularly promoted on EMY's social media in correspondence with the communication strategy (see Deliverable 5.2).

Similar to the pre-election phase, in order to increase the response rate of the survey, all respondents were invited to take part in the lottery by providing their names and e-mail addresses at the end of the survey. The project team offered 5 event gift cards (Piletilevi²) to the winners of the lottery (each worth 50 EUR).

Overall, 73 respondents completed the survey (see the list of survey questions in Annex 4). The overall response can be considered as a good one confirming the interest on the part of the mobile students in the issues raised by the survey. The respondents represented 18 EU

¹ The procedure was identical to the dissemination during pre-election period. See Deliverable 4.3 for more details.

² Piletilevi is Estonia's largest on-line ticket selling network. Available at: <https://www.piletilevi.ee/eng/> 26.06.2019

countries. Top five countries were the following: Germany (16%), Italy (15%), Finland (10%), Latvia (8%), and Slovakia (8%). Mobile youth aged 18 to 24 and 25 to 29 years old constituted 48% and 52% of respondents respectively. Also, almost equal distribution of respondents in terms of gender was observed: 52% male and 47% female, with the remaining percent preferring not to disclose their gender. The overwhelming majority study or work in Tallinn (84%). Most of the respondents came for their studies or professional training (56%), one fourth came for work, 15% indicated other reasons and the rest, for travelling and discovery. A majority (54%) of mobile students are enrolled at TalTech (27% at Tallinn University and 12% at University of Tartu, 2% at Estonian Academy of Arts, 2% at Tartu Health Care College, and the rest indicated other institutions). Students were enrolled in the Bachelor's (48%) and Master's (44%) programmes almost in equal proportions. A significant proportion of the respondents can be called newcomers, since 41% have been living in Estonia since 2019 and 21% since 2018. 21% of respondents indicated their long-term plans for staying in Estonia (more than 5 years), while about 23% were not sure about their stay and 37% said they would stay up to 1 year. Additionally, 71% of the respondents were living outside their home-countries at the time of the 2019 EP elections.

1.2 Post-Election Focus Groups (FG II.3. and II.4.)

The implementation of the post-election focus groups followed the methodology and guidance notes provided in WP2 (Deliverable 2.1). The post-election mapping activities in Estonia included two focus groups involving both principle and extended target groups (students and working youth). The first focus group was conducted in the premises of e-Governance Academy on 05/12/2019, while the second one was conducted virtually on 23/04/2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the sanitary restrictions imposed by the Estonian government to deal with the crisis. In total, 17 participants attended the two events. The lists of participants of both focus groups are enclosed in Annex 5 and Annex 6, which have restrictive access due to the anonymity of the participants.

1.2.1 First focus group (FG II.3.) (05/12/2019)

The first focus group was conducted with the representatives of the principal and extended target group and the political community of Estonia. This focus group was concentrated on stimulating a direct exchange of views between young mobile EU citizens and host-country policymakers. The representatives of youth organisations of all Estonian parties that make up the European Parliament were invited to take part in the focus group.

As suggested by WP2, the discussion was structured along four themes (some questions addressed to the target group only, some to politicians only). These are aligned with other mapping and interaction activities in the post-election phase:

- Theme 1: EU citizenship rights and engagement of the target group in 2019 EP elections
- Theme 2: (Continuous) Participation of the target group in EU and host-country political life
- Theme 3: Information needs and preferred communication channels of the target group
- Theme 4: The role of stakeholders

The participants of the first focus group were recruited via key stakeholders, distribution of project flyers and social media channels. More specifically, the invitations (see Annex 1) were shared with the e-Governance Technologies and Services Programme at Tallinn University of

Technology, Student Council of the School of Governance, Law and Society, Tallinn University, Academic Affairs Office, Tallinn University (degree and Erasmus students), Mobility Center and Tallinn Law School in TalTech (degree and Erasmus students), Expat Relocation Estonia. In addition, around 30 flyers were distributed at Tallinn University inviting students to the focus group (13/11/2019). Also, invitation was posted twice (22/11/2019 and 27/11/2019) in the ESN International Club WhatsApp group of Tallinn University (comprising over 200 international students). The representatives of party youth organisations were invited directly over e-mail and, if necessary, invitation was repeated with the phone calls. All 5 parties (coalition and opposition) that make up the Estonian Parliament were invited – Estonian Centre Party, Conservative People's Party of Estonia, Estonian Reform Party, Isamaa Party, Social Democratic Party. Representatives of 3 parties were present during the focus group – the Estonian Centre Party, Isamaa Party and Estonian Reform Party.

Furthermore, the project team proposed an incentive for participating in the focus group – a two-day trip to visit the European Parliament in Brussels. The trip was organised and financed by the Estonian MEP – Marina Kaljurand³ - who proposed the project team during the interview to invite 6 representatives of the target group to join Estonian youth on a trip to Brussels. The trip became part of EMY project interaction and raising awareness activities. The lottery draw for 2 of the places in the trip took place at the end of the focus group.



Figure 1 Focus Group II.3. held on 05.12.2019 in Tallinn

In the introductory part of the first focus group an attendance list was circulated where the participants had to enter their names in a specifically designated spreadsheet. Each row in the spreadsheet was pre-numbered so each participant was identified in the analysis process as follows: Participant 1, Participant 2, and so on.

The first focus group discussion lasted for approximately 120 minutes and was run by two moderators (one main moderator and one supporting moderator). The composition of the focus groups was intended to be as diverse as possible. The FG1 comprised of 9 degree-seeking and Erasmus students and working youth originating from Germany, Spain, Italy, Austria and Portugal and 3 representatives of Estonian parties (in total 12 participants).

The discussion was recorded; however, the anonymity of the respondents was guaranteed. The introductory part briefly presented the main focus of the EMY project and the topics to be discussed. A PowerPoint presentation (Annex 7) was also prepared with the questions projected to guide the discussion.

³ https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/197491/MARINA_KALJURAND/home

1.2.2 Second focus group (FG II.4.) (23/04/2020)

The recruitment of participants for the second focus groups was launched just a while before Estonian government declared the state of emergency on 12/03/2020 due to the pandemic of COVID-19⁴. By that time the project team shared the invitation to the second post-election focus group with some stakeholder from the Tallinn University. Also, the invitation to the post-election survey and the focus groups was sent to all eligible EU voters aged 18-29 in Estonia (Annex 2) on 11/03/2019. The scheduled date of the face-to-face post-election focus group was 31/03/2020. Due to the outbreak of COVID-19 in Estonia, EMY consortium jointly agreed to postpone the post-election focus group until 23/04/2020 and to conduct it online via GoToWebinar platform. The participants who registered for the 31/03/2020 had all been notified directly via provided e-mail about the postponement of the event and the new date (Annex 3). Eight (8) participants confirmed their disposition to participate in the new upcoming date. Two (2) additional participants registered at the beginning of April for a total of ten (10) participants. All of these participants were preliminary notified on 09/04/2020 of the upcoming event and technological platform. A reminder email was sent on 20/04/2020 to the ten (10) participants, informing them of some instructions / best practices and requesting them to register in the technological platform for the webinar. By registering they would have received the event details to include in their digital calendars and an automatic reminder on the day of the events. As suggested and jointly discussed with WP2 (see Deliverable D.2.1. “Guiding documentation for implementing mapping and interaction activities”) the focus group discussed following themes:

- Theme 1: Participation of the target group in the host-country’s political and social life and the role of stakeholders to support them in their efforts.
- Theme 2: EU citizenship rights and political engagement opportunities for the target group at the EU level.
- Theme 3: Experience of the target group regarding the COVID-19 outbreak and the extraordinary measures in the EU member states.



Figure 2 Screenshot capture of the recording of the FG II.4. held virtually on 23.04.2020

⁴ <https://news.err.ee/1063224/estonian-government-declares-emergency-situation-against-coronavirus>

The focus group discussion lasted for approximately ninety (90) minutes and were run by two (2) moderators and a technical organizer. The composition of the focus groups was intended to be as diverse as possible. The FG II.4. comprised of five (5) students and working youth from (Spain, France, Slovakia and the Netherlands). Due to technical issues one of the participants was not able to connect his camera, and another one connected from a device without a camera.

The discussion was recorded; however, the anonymity of the respondents was guaranteed. Also, the introductory part briefly presented the main focus of the EMY project and the topics to be discussed. A PowerPoint presentation (Annex 8) was also prepared with the questions and information to guide the discussion. At the end of the discussion, the moderators asked for feedback on the GoToWebinar platform and advertised the upcoming crowdsourcing event.

1.3 Stakeholder Interviews

During the post-election period four interviews with the political community and three interviews with key stakeholders were conducted by the project team in Estonia. As suggested by the methodology provided in Deliverable 2.1., the focus group with the political community was replaced by the semi-structured open-ended interviews, since the non-public and less confrontational format permits policymakers to respond more openly as well as to provide more technical details, when appropriate.

1.3.1 Interviews with political representatives (MEPs)

As previously mentioned project partners conducted four interviews with MEPs from Estonia. In accordance with the guidance provided by WP2, the objective of the interviews with was threefold:

- 1) To inform MEPs about the project and to explain the profile of the target group, its significance and heterogeneity;
- 2) To find out whether they consider mobile students/mobile youth as their constituency and how important were they to them as a target group in the 2019 European elections;
- 3) To see whether they consider the current systems and procedures to be adequate for the needs of this particular target group and whether they have any suggestions for improvement.

These interviews with the MEPs from Estonia were conducted during autumn 2019 and beginning of winter 2020. The following MEPs were interviewed:

- **MEP Marina Kaljurand⁵ (29/10/2019)**

Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament Member / Estonia - Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erakond (Social Democratic Party)

⁵ https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/197491/MARINA_KALJURAND/home




Figure 3 Interview with MEP Marina Kaljurand (Social Democratic Party)

- **MEP Urmas Paet⁶ (29/11/2019)**

Renew Europe Group / Estonia - Eesti Reformierakond (Estonian Reform Party)



Figure 4 Interview with MEP Urmas Paet (Estonian Reform Party)

- **MEP Andrus Ansip⁷ (09/12/2019)**

Renew Europe Group / Estonia - Eesti Reformierakond (Estonian Reform Party)

- **MEP Jaak Madison⁸ (23/01/2020)**

Identity and Democracy Group/ Estonia - Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond (Estonian Conservative Party)

From this point forward, the MEPs have been anonymized. The list of MEPs and their identification are enclosed in Annex 9, which has restrictive access in order to protect the anonymity of the participants and their responses.

⁶ https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/129073/URMAS_PAET/home

⁷ https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/124696/ANDRUS_ANSIP/home

⁸ https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/197493/JAAK_MADISON/home

1.3.2 Interviews with other stakeholders

In addition to the MEP interviews, three additional semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders were conducted. They were selected from the EP representation in Estonia, the Estonian Government and a University Association. The first interview was conducted on-site in the EP Liaison Office on 23/10/2019 with two interviewees. The remaining two interviews were conducted remotely, via Skype, on 05/05/2020 and 06/05/2020, due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the sanitary restrictions imposed by the Estonian government to deal with the crisis. The list of interviewees is enclosed in Annex 9, which has restrictive access due to the anonymity of the participants.

- **Liaison Office in Estonia of the Directorate-General for Communication of the European Parliament – 23/10/2019**

The EP Liaison Office in Estonia is involved in community engagement and initiatives such as *'thistimeiamvoting'* campaign, among many others.

- **Ministry of the Interior – 05/05/2020**

The Ministry of the Interior coordinates this "Settle in Estonia" Programme, which is funded 85% by the European Social Fund and 15% by the Estonian Government. The programme started in 2015, its aim is to promote the independent coping of new immigrants in Estonia by providing them with necessary information. EU citizens participate in the programme together with other foreigners, but the content of the courses takes into account the different legal status of EU citizens from other foreigners. Approximately half of the participants in the programme have come to Estonia from other EU member states, and the rest, from third countries.

- **Tallinn University International Club (ESN TU IC) – 06/05/2020**

ESN TU IC operates on a voluntary basis and deals with students who wish to join its organization activities. The proportion of Erasmus students and full Bachelor or Master Programme students reaching out ESN TU IC is roughly 50/50. There are no special activities for EU students, but around 2/3 of the participants of all events qualify as EMYs (the rest come from third countries).

1.4 Desk Analysis of Party Electoral Programmes

The interest of mobile youth to participate in EP elections seemingly also depends on whether the political parties address issues that are important to this group of voters. Therefore, it is of interest to analyse which topics the parties deal with on their electoral platforms and which of those are of greater interest to mobile youth. To this end, an analysis of the party election manifestos in the project countries has been carried out.

After Brexit, Estonia has 7 seats in the EP. The elections took place on May 25th, 2019 based on the European Parliament Election Act⁹. Voting age starts from 18 years, age of candidates should be at least 21 years by Election Day. By law, parties and independent candidates are eligible to stand for election. Political parties shall participate in under their own name.

There are 14 political parties in Estonia registered in the Business Register¹⁰, of which 9 participated in the European Parliament elections in 2019 and 5 won a seat in the European Parliament¹¹ (Figure 5).

| Party /candidate | Alliance | Share of votes | Seats |
|--------------------------------|----------|----------------|------------------|
| Reform Party | ALDE | 26,2% | 2 |
| Social Democratic Party | PES | 23,3% | 2 |
| Centre Party | ALDE | 14,4% | 1 |
| EKRE (Conservatives) | EAPN | 12,7% | 1 |
| Isamaa | EPP | 10,3% | 1 (after Brexit) |
| Estonia 200 | | 3,2% | - |
| Estonian Greens | | 1,8% | - |
| Biodiversity Party | | 0,9% | - |

Figure 5 Table presenting the results of the European Parliament elections in Estonia

The active election campaign period is defined by law as the period from the last day of registration of candidates to the Election Day. Active election campaigning is prohibited on Election Day. Strange enough, outdoor political advertising of candidates and political parties is prohibited during the active campaign period. Because of this rule, outdoor campaigning starts already a few months before Election Day and ends at least 4 weeks before Election Day.

There is no statutory requirement for political parties to provide their elaborated electoral platform to the public, but this is good practice followed by almost all political parties. All parties that ran in the EP elections, have been included in the analysis.

1.4.1 Selection of the policy topics for the analysis

The basis for the elaboration of policy categories for analysis were the following research questions:

1. What EU policy issues are important for the Austrian/Estonian political parties? What are the parties' views on these issues?

⁹ For the European Parliament Election Act please click [here](#).

¹⁰ For more information about the Estonian political parties present in the Business Register please click [here](#).

¹¹ For more information about the Estonian results to the EP Elections in 2019 please click [here](#).

2. Do the Austrian/Estonian parties pay special attention to mobile EU citizens, especially to the European mobile youth?

The first question served as an input for the post-election online survey to find out if the topics that matter to the parties are also relevant to mobile youth. The second question stems directly from the project's primary objective of contributing to the political and social integration of mobile youth in the host-country.

As a first step, the electoral platforms of Austrian and Estonian parties were scrutinized in general to identify the policy topics dealt with by parties. It turned out that the topics overlap to a large extent. The comparison of the lists of the topics enables the definition of common policy categories which were used for the content analysis of the party electoral platforms. The categories are ranked starting with topics that describe general functioning of EU and the rights of the EU citizens, followed by more specific policy areas.

The policy categories are as follows.

1. **Vision of the EU/ MS sovereignty:** General vision of the party about the future of the EU, sovereignty of member states (MS) and proposals for EU reform.
2. **Fundamental rights/rule of law:** General views of the party on protection of fundamental rights and justice for EU citizens, protection of social and civil rights and measures to safeguard rule of law.
3. **Democratic functioning of the EU:** Proposals of the party to improve decision making and administrative processes within the current framework of the EU.
4. **Economic policy:** General views of the party on economic policy and socio-economic model of the EU.
5. **Social policy:** General views of the party related to the responsibility of the EU for social affairs, harmonization on minimal social standards of member states.
6. **Education/youth policy:** General views of the party on education/youth policy, quality of education, especially on student mobility and respective programmes.
7. **Regional policy:** General views on harmonization of regional development of the EU.
8. **Foreign/security policy:** General views of the party on common foreign and security policy of the EU, including neighbourhood policies.
9. **Migration policy:** General views of the party on migration policy and proposed measures to cope with the immigration.
10. **EU Budget/taxation:** General views on the formation of the EU budget and taxation policies.
11. **Environmental policy/climate change:** General views of the party on protection of environment, especially related to climate change.
12. **Agricultural/food policy:** General views of the party on the Common Agricultural policy and food safety.

13. Digital EU: General views of the party on digitalization and innovation policies of the EU, including protection of digital rights of citizens.

In addition, party election slogans are recorded. Those summarize the main message of the party to voters.

For each category, the first question to look for was whether the electoral platform has addressed the topic. If yes, the short description of the party's position was extracted from the text of the platform. Wherever possible, the wording of the platform has been used.

The results of the desk analysis are presented in the Excel table (Annex 10) and Chapter 2 (specifically Figure 27). The first column of the table presents the policy categories and the first row the name of the political party. Links to the election platforms are presented in the second row and the following rows display the content of the platform for the respective category. Visualization tool has been used to provide an overview of the topics covered by Estonian political parties. The English overview is accessible by clicking [here](#)¹².

¹² Overview in Estonian available [here](#).

2 Key Findings

The following chapter will present the findings of the post-election mapping and interaction activities by mirroring the structure of the preceding one. The post-election survey will be presented first, followed by the two focus groups, the multiple interviews and finalizing with the desk research. The information presented in this chapter will be further analysed and commented in the third chapter.

2.1 Post-Election Survey (Survey II) (10/02/2020 – 09/04/2020)

This section will present the results of the post-election survey. The percentages in the following graphs have been rounded to the nearest integer, while those presented in the third chapter will be rounded to the nearest decimal. Seventy-three (73) respondents completed the survey, which equates to the total number of respondents, when referenced in the presentation and analysis of the results.

Theme 1: EU citizenship rights and engagement of the target group in 2019 EP elections

Of all survey respondents, 62% voted in the 2019 European Parliament elections (37% were living outside their home-countries during and 25% were in their home-countries at the time of the EP elections) (Figure 6).

Did you vote in the 2019 European Parliament elections?





Figure 6 Survey results to the question “Did you vote in the 2019 EP elections?”

As for the rest of respondents (the 38% who did not vote), they answered as follows (Figure 7) when asked about the reasons for not voting:

Why did you not vote?



- A: I would have voted if I had known about the EP Elections in time
- B: I have no interest in EU politics / I only vote in (national) elections in my home country
- C: I wanted to vote for a home-country party / candidate but I missed the deadline for registration
- D: I wanted to vote for a host-country party / candidate but I missed the deadline for registration
- E: I wanted to vote for a home-country party / candidate but it was too complicated to get registered
- F: I have no interest in politics generally
- G: I never vote in any elections
- H: Other (please specify)

Figure 7 Survey results to the question “Why did you not vote?”

Among the 'Other' reasons presented for not voting, we can reproduce the following three individual answers:

"I did not feel represented by any candidate or party."

"[I] Lived very far from [the] voting place."

"I was very busy at that time and to vote in Czechia it is necessary to vote at your home town (which is very small village with hard accessibility) or to create through long procedure a voter-pass. So I decided not to vote."

As previously stated, 71% of the respondents were living outside their home-countries at the time of the 2019 EP elections. Of this sub-category of respondents, 48% did not vote (equivalent to 34% of the total number of respondents). Of the remaining 52% who voted in the 2019 EP elections and were living outside their home-countries, were further asked to identify their voting choice: 38% voted for a home-country party/candidate, 14% voted for a host-country (in this case Estonia) party/candidate (these percentages are equivalent to 37%, 27% and 10% of the total number of respondents, respectively) (Figure 8).

In the 2019 European Parliament elections,
did you cast your vote ...





Figure 8 Survey results to the selection statement "In the 2019 EP elections, did you cast your vote..."

Of those that voted for a home-country party/candidate from the previous graph, their reasons were as follows (Figure 9):

Why did you cast your vote for a home-country party / candidate?



- A: I always vote in elections in my home country
- B: I can make a better / more effective contribution to EU politics by voting in my home country
- C: I do not know / am not interested in the politics of my host country
- D: I was not aware that I could cast my vote in Estonia
- E: I wanted to vote in my host country but did not find sufficient information on host-country parties / candidates
- F: I do not understand the Estonian language well enough to follow the political discussion / campaign
- G: Other (please specify)

Figure 9 Survey results to the question "Why did you cast your vote for a home-country party/candidate?"

Among the 'Other' reasons presented for voting for a home-country party/candidate (Figure 9), we can reproduce all the individual answers:

"I could not vote for [the] Estonian party."

"I didn't know enough about Estonian politics."

"Wanted to vote for Estonian party but it was too late to register. Next time I will vote for Estonian candidates because Estonia is my country now."

The previous results (Figure 9) can be summarized as being: 65% declared it was due to pragmatism or home-country bias (reasons A, B and C), and the rest 35% due to various administrative, information and communication issues or deficits (reasons D, E, F and G).

The next question was also directed specifically to the 62% that voted in the 2019 European Parliament elections. While staying in Estonia, 13% of the voters used I-voting, and 2% didn't. The majority of all voters (76%) reacted positively at the idea of using online/internet voting, if it had been available for the 2019 EP elections (31% were in Estonia at the time, 11% in another EU country, and 34% in their home-country) (Figure 10).




Figure 10 Survey results to the use and willingness of use (if available) of I-voting

The 11% that replied negatively selected the following arguments against I-voting (these statements options were not mutually exclusive, and the respondents could select more than one):

"I have concerns about the technical reliability of the service."

"I am concerned that my vote may be compromised by manipulation or fraud."

"I generally prefer doing things in person and not online."

"That day I also had to vote for local election, local ones did not allowed that option so I did both together."

"I like the idea of a citizen duty to "go" and vote and maybe have a small talk with other voters."

Of the rest 38% that did not vote in the 2019 EP elections (Figure 8), 79% were living in Estonia during the 2019 EP elections. This subgroup was asked if they knew about the option to cast their votes through I-voting and 55% responded positively. The remaining 45% claimed that

they were not aware, but confirmed they would have been more likely to vote if they had known about I-voting. There percentages are equivalent to 16% and 14%, respectively, in the context of the total respondents of the survey.

Did you know about the option to cast your vote online (i-voting) in the 2019 EP Elections in Estonia?




Figure 11 Survey results to the question “Did you know about the option to cast your vote online (I-voting) in the 2019 EP Elections in Estonia?”

The question regarding the right to vote for either a home- or host-country party / candidate when living in another EU country was asked to the 38% of total respondents that did not vote in the 2019 EP elections. 54% of were aware of this right, and 46% were not (these values correspond to 21% and 18% of all respondents) (Figure 12).

Did you know that when you go to live in another EU country you have the choice in EP Elections to vote for a party / candidate from your home country or your host country?




Figure 12 Survey results to the question “Did you know that when you go to live in another EU country you have the choice in EP Elections to vote for a party / candidate from your home country or your host country?”

The following question, unlike the preceding one, was asked of all respondents. 69% of all respondents were aware of their right to vote in local government elections in their host countries, while 30% were not, and the rest did not respond (Figure 13).

Did you know that you have the right to vote in local government (council / district assembly) elections in your host country while you are living there?




Figure 13 Survey results to the question “Did you know that you have the right to vote in local government (council / district assembly) elections in your host country while you are living there?”

Theme 2: (Continuous) Participation of the target group in EU and host-country political life

All the respondents of the survey were asked if they followed the political parties' campaigns for the 2019 EP elections. A large majority followed the campaigns, 52% those of their home-country's political parties and 21% of their host-country's political parties (Figure 14).




Figure 14 Survey results to the question “Did you follow the political parties' campaigns for the 2019 EP Elections?”

Those following the campaigns were asked if the parties or candidates addressed the topics that mattered to the respondents. Of those following home-country politics, 42% answered “Yes”, 53% “*Not sufficiently*”, and 5% “No” (taken in the context of all the respondents these percentages are equivalent to 22%, 27% and 3% respectively). Of those following host-country politics, 60% answered “Yes”, and 40% “*Not sufficiently*”, (taken in the context of all the respondents these percentages are equivalent to 12% and 9% respectively).

With regard to political topics, the respondents were allowed to select multiple choices. The top selections referred to climate change, youth and migration policy. The least selected were economic, agriculture/food, and taxation policies (Figure 15).




Figure 15 Survey results to the question “Indicate the three topics that you consider most important”

In the case of the other topics (Figure 15) indicated by the respondents, the following were mentioned:

"Harmonization of the work regulations across the EU countries."

"Equal rights for LGBT people all over Europe."

"The right to health."

Regarding the topic of political, social or civic involvement in the host country, the majority (84%) of the respondents were not involved at the time of the post-election survey. The remaining were participating actively (Figure 16).

Are you currently involved in any political, social or civic activity in your host country?




Figure 16 Survey results to the question "Are you currently involved in any political, social or civic activity in your host country?"

This majority (84% of the respondents) was asked the reasons behind their non-participation in the host country. They were allowed to choose more than one response. The most selected response (49%) was of not having sufficient time to devote simultaneously with their studies or work. Language barriers were the next most frequent explanations. Among these options there was one that was not selected at all *"I don't believe in public (civic, political) activism and participation and don't believe it can solve any social problems"* (Figure 17).

Why are you not getting involved in political, social or civic activities in your host country?




Figure 17 Survey results to the question "Why are you not getting involved in political, social or civic activities in your host country?"


Among the other reasons (Figure 17) given for non-participation in host-country activities were the following:

"I haven't got to know any social activity without the need of searching for it."

“There is not a single party in my host country that has views I can get behind. I know it's never possible to 100% agree with a party but in Estonia, it's really bad. When voting, I really only gave my vote in order for EKRE and their fascists to have one less vote.”

The following question of Figure 18 dealt with the respondents' auto-reflection. They were asked where they considered themselves citizens of. The greatest majority of all the respondents (44%) answered of their *“home country first, the EU second.”* It was followed by the choices of *“both, in equal measure”* (26%) and *“the EU first, my home country second”* (20%).

In your own view, do you consider yourself a citizen of ...



- A: ... the EU only
- B: ... the EU first, my home country second
- C: ... both, in equal measure
- D: ... my home country first, the EU second
- E: ... my home country only
- F: ... none of the two

Figure 18 Survey results to the selection statement “In your own view, do you consider yourself a citizen of...”

Aggregating the previous results (Figure 18), it is shown that a large majority (93%) of respondents consider themselves citizens of the EU in some measure.

In regard to the existing EU-related platforms, a great majority of the respondents (between 70% and 95%) either skipped the questions in their entirety or declared they didn't know the platforms at all (Figure 19). The best known of these platforms was the website of the European Youth Parliament and the European Parliament Petitions Portal.

**Were you aware of these platforms?
How useful were they to you?**




Figure 19 Partial survey results to the questions “Were you aware of these platforms? How useful were they to you?”

The least known platforms were the European Youth Card Association's Give a Vote website, AEGEE's¹³ YVote website, and the European Citizens Crowdsourcing (EUCROWD) site.

With reference to recommendations on how to improve youth engagement at the EU level, the respondents were allowed to select multiple answers, as presented in Figure 20. The top choices referred to information: about the EU and its matter on daily life (49%) and real-life concrete evidence on how a citizen's vote can make the difference (40%).




Figure 20 Survey results to the question “What should be improved, in your view, to encourage young EU citizens like yourself to become more actively engaged in political discussions regarding the EU (through voting in EP elections, and otherwise)?”

In the same vein, Figure 21 poses the question in relation to participation in the host-country and possible recommendations that could improve it (multiple selection was once again allowed). The majority of all the respondents answered “*Show me that, as a foreigner, I am welcome to participate in political and social life of the community*” (71%) and “*Provide better official information about voting dates, registration procedures and other formal requirements to participate in local elections*” (51%).




Figure 21 Survey results to the question “What could be improved to encourage young EU citizens who live and study / work abroad to participate more frequently / actively in the political life of their host country (through voting in local elections, and otherwise)?”

¹³ Association des États Généraux des Étudiants de l'Europe - <https://www.aegee.org/>

Some of the other options (Figure 21) provided by the respondents themselves were:

“Provide information in English.”

“Send an email that it is happening with the instructions how to vote and where to find info about candidates.”

“Make information about the political and social life of the community more readily available in English.”

“I live in a country governed by a parliament that hates foreigners and all kinds of minorities. Doesn't want to make me participate if I know I'm not welcome in my host country anyway.”

Theme 3: Information needs and preferred communication channels of the target group

The following questions covered news and information sources. Of all respondents, only 21% do not follow news and other sources / channels of information about the EU and about the host country (Figure 22).




Figure 22 Survey results to the question “Are you following news and other sources / channels of public information about a) the EU and b) your host country?”

Of the 26% that only follow EU news, the top reasons were: *“I don’t understand the host-country language well enough which is an obstacle for me to follow local news and media”* and *“I have been living in my host country for too short a time to follow local news and media.”* Of the 21% that do not follow EU nor host-country news at all, the most selected reasons were: *“I have no interest in politics generally”* and *“I am busy with my studies / work and don’t have sufficient time to devote myself to follow the political news.”*

All of the respondents were asked about their news sources (multiple selection was available) (Figure 23). The majority of the respondents consume news through media portals / news websites (74%), social media (59%) and newspapers (digital and print) (52%). The least used medium was television (18%).




Figure 23 Survey results to the selection statement “Do your news sources include...”

Regarding the respondents preference on where and how they would like to find information on host-country participation (Figure 24), the majority selected dedicated portal or apps (60%) and host-country national authorities' websites and publications (60%). The only physical medium, i.e. offices and helpdesks, received the lowest preference (16%).



Figure 24 Survey results to the question “Where, and how, would you like to find information on how to participate in the political, social and civic life of your host country while you are here?”

Theme 4: The role of stakeholders

According to the respondents (Figure 25), the preferred stakeholders to provide relevant information of the EU-level would be the EU institutions / agencies themselves (55%), and the host- and home-country authorities (48% and 45% respectively).




Figure 25 Survey results to the question “Who could help you best with providing relevant information on EP Elections and other opportunities of engaging at the EU level?”

According to the respondents (Figure 26), the preferred stakeholders to provide relevant information on engagement in Estonia would be the local and national authorities themselves (53% and 48% respectively), followed by the EU institutions / agencies (45%).




Figure 26 Survey results to the question “Who could help you best with providing relevant information on local elections and other opportunities of engaging here in Estonia?”

2.2 Post-Election Focus Group (FG II.3. and II.4.)

2.2.1 First focus group (FG II.3.) (05/12/2019)

Theme 1: EU citizenship rights and engagement of EMYs in 2019 EP Elections

Except for one participant, all EMYs resided in the home countries when the EP elections took place. They had an opportunity to cast their vote only for their home-country candidates. If they had been outside their home-country, they would still prefer to vote for the home-country candidates, as explained by one of the participants.

“I wouldn't vote for an Estonian candidate, is because I know my candidate better... And let's say you are not here for very long, it is very difficult for me to see what this person wants. So, I would rather vote for a German candidate.” (Participant 1, FG II.3.)

The participant, who was residing in another EU country, was not able to vote because of non-sufficient information on registration procedure. In the words of the participant:

“And information [about registration] was not really provided in a good way. If you did not search by yourself, and tried to find all the things you needed, no one will do it for you. Even if you upload documents that you were abroad, they would not send you anything. So it was really difficult.” (Participant 3, FG II.3.)

It also appeared that in Italy the election regulation is too rigid for people residing outside of their election district, as stated by the following participants.

“The problem is that you can only vote at your hometown, and there is not the possibility to change your voting to another place... it was impossible for me to come back because the next day I had an exam.” (Participant 5, FG II.3.)

“I came back home for voting, but I know many people who could not come back. Because they would have had to pay a 200 euros ticket. It is a very big problem. It is very hard to voting in Italy, if you do not have money.” (Participant 3, FG II.3.)

The young politicians were asked if they were aware of the barriers that EU citizens and EMYs encountered when attempting to vote in Estonia. According to them, events have been held in both Estonian and Russian, the latter due to the existing large Russian-speaking minority, but there is less interest to hold them in a third language. However, in order to consider that, the demand must come from the population, as explained by the young politicians.

“I feel like so many people are not even interested in EU elections even when it's spoken in Estonian, and you are in Estonia you have lived in Estonia for the entirety of your life. So I consider that someone attracted to politics and policies that are not Estonian, I think that is a high bar.” (Participant 10, FG II.3.)

“I basically agree, in the sense that there are some issues that cloud these things; for example, that people are not generally interested in EU elections. And I find that parties and public officials in general focus on these issues rather than the language barrier, since there is already such a big community of minorities in Estonia that do not speak Estonian, this is like the third issue on the list that people consider.” (Participant 12, FG II.3.)

“It is all about demand, if we go four years forward we can see that lots of foreign students is growing quite rapidly. In theory, if we are moving forward, there would be

either a party or candidate who sees a potential, because you have a group of voters that no one is talking to.” (Participant 11, FG II.3.)

When asked about ever considering the youth as voters, the young politicians relied once again on notions of effort and demand.

“All depends on what you expect the profit of the effort would be. So as long as you're putting resources, you expect a return, and if that's not coming, then that's a problem.” (Participant 11, FG II.3.)

“I do agree there is no market for these people. And in order to exploit that market, you would need a lot of resources, and then we would still need people that are interested in politics in the first place.” (Participant 10, FG II.3.)

When asked about their self-identity as a citizen of the EU, home-country or both, the respondents relate to them in different levels and degrees. Nevertheless some of those participants that have self-identified as citizens of the EU, previously identified themselves more strongly as citizens of their home countries. As mentioned by Participants 1, 3 and 8, the experiences acquired during travels might have helped foster this EU identity.

“I feel more European... I am still Italian. But I am here where I am today thanks to Europe. Even if the EU has lots of problems... Facing the geopolitical problems alone is not a possibility. The only possibility is to work together.” (Participant 5, FG II.3.)

“We should think of the EU the same way we feel about our national countries. Not just see the EU as the rational option or a bureaucratic machinery, but more as diversity, and cooperation, and liberal democracy. To get more of this identity, Europe must be an identity... Before I started traveling a lot two years ago, I would've said I was more German.” (Participant 1, FG II.3.)

“I also feel like I am more European because those challenges like climate change or migration are only manageable if we work together. And second, I live in a border town minutes away from Switzerland, Germany, so I never really felt that I am Austrian.” (Participant 7, FG II.3.)

“For me it was the first Spanish, but now that I am into this Erasmus programme, I am more into this EU feeling. I couldn't agree more with my colleagues that the EU is more than institutions, but about our common history and traditions, which are missing from the discussion.” (Participant 8, FG II.3.)

“I feel both. But definitely more European than Italian. Since I have left Italy I've been traveling around all Europe, and if it wasn't for the EU I would not be able to do it.” (Participant 3, FG II.3.)

“More Estonian than European, but at least for my generation they both go into the same box. It is the kind of European value it means that you are open and you can do stuff, and that now falls into the category of being Estonian. The EU citizenship means exchanging knowledge, and also incentivizing this exchange.” (Participant 10, FG II.3.)

“I feel half and half. I am Estonian but also consider myself as European. I am sure there is a little bit of a more nationalistic idea in the Baltic countries. But if somebody asks me I would say at first, I am Estonian. But I do definitely consider myself an EU

citizen. It also means for me to be part of a wider thing and connected to other countries: and other cultures.” (Participant 12, FG II.3.)

“Basically, Eastwards from Central Europe, people feel more nationalistic.” (Participant 11, FG II.3.)

“The European entity is not strong enough. We need to make the EU parliament more significant for the EU population.” (Participant 2, FG II.3.)

“I measure my national feeling in terms of problems and goals that I consider.” (Participant 9, FG II.3.)

Theme 2: (Continuous) Participation of the target group in EU and host-country’s political life

One participant had a positive opinion on internet voting (I-voting), as an additional comfortable channel to cast a vote. According to the participant, it would be comfortable for “...students that are studying far away from home”, but it might not work “...in particular with older people.” (Participant 5, FG II.3.)

Specific agendas and issues that interested EMYs as a continuation in the political stage included climate change, EU reforms, social work and digitalization efforts.

“In Germany, last election was made climate election, we called it. It was about this one topic.... It was our future is at risk because of climate change, and people are not doing anything. And we can only tackle this challenge at the European level. So it was this simplification that made people vote, because then they have in mind that, Europe is now this project.” (Participant 6, FG II.3.)

“In Austria we didn’t have this climate change topic... Climate change was important for me.” (Participant 7, FG II.3.)

“And in my case climate change but also EU-reforms, because there are a lot of crisis in other countries in Europe that less and less people are concerned with the EU project; and it should be reformed, because it’s an ambitious thing. If you reform EU policies you can engage more young people.” (Participant 9, FG II.3.)

“So I’d say my interest is digital EU; to make it closer to the youth. And I think it’s all working on policies, but I’d like to see youth policy, and involving them the youth into social work. I would promote that, because the young people are the most interested in issues that are relevant such as climate change, but I think that we think about others. So, promoting social work.” (Participant 8, FG II.3.)

“But all countries going forward with this digitalization of voting process. But how do we do it, like is there going to be a deadline as well? How is the procedure going to be?” (Participant 4, FG II.3.)

In response to the aforementioned topics to focus on during election, or the need to focus on a single one of them, the young politicians replied:

“In Estonia, last EU elections, we did not have a single focus topic, because I do not think there was a whole lot of people that you could use only one topic for the elections.”

There was focus on the climate topic, on digital use, and also the future of the EU.” (Participant 12, FG II.3.)

“Elections are not that much about region, but about [international and national] context.” (Participant 11, FG II.3.)

“The topics chosen for the European elections are way too wide. But also, the politicians are rather, they are not engaging with the topics that people actually have in mind. And the politicians that are, phrase them in a really crude way...” (Participant 10, FG II.3.)

Additionally, EMYs believe multiple elections happening so close to each other have a detrimental impact on the focus of EU elections (e.g. political candidates are more focused on localized efforts than global ones), in addition to creating some limitations when campaigning.

“In Spain we didn't have many campaigns because one month before we had general elections. And also, on Sunday we had local elections, and regional elections. So, the campaign was more focused to this. I think politicians in Spain give more importance to what happens in your town, or what happens in your autonomous region than what happens in Europe.” (Participant 2, FG II.3.)

“In Portugal it was like in Spain, because a lot of politicians were focused on the local things.” (Participant 9, FG II.3.)

Theme 3: Information needs and preferred communication channels of the target group

The Citizens' Initiative was approached by Participant 1 when discussing ways in which the European youth could influence EU policies most effectively. However, the fact that one million signatures are needed is both a pro and a con.

“This kind of democratic system is not good at all in terms of representation and in how citizens think about politics. Because it's like a filter, that citizens nowadays are stopped by these representative democracies, and citizen initiatives are difficult to get in...” (Participant 9, FG II.3.)

“The filters are necessary. If we talk about the increasing populist waves... and let's say you would just need one hundred thousand signatures, it would be very easy for some movements to say 'let's close our borders'... Democracy works both ways, so if we have good ideas, someone will have bad ideas.” (Participant 11, FG II.3.)

“...because for the horrible causes you can get these million signatures, from all across the borders because you have one message... but for good messages, the messages are always 'maybe' about something, but they don't say what they offer...” (Participant 10, FG II.3.)

“The problem is not only to find the signature, but also the administrative procedures. You bring the proposal to the European Parliament but then it needs to be approved by the council of ministers. So, this mixture of intergovernmental and democratic institutions is another barrier. There is a similar system in Italy, but this system is outdated. There must be a new system, maybe using the Internet and e-government. It would be more effective to find the signatures, through electronic signatures. For us it's like utopia, but for Estonia not.” (Participant 5, FG II.3.)

Regarding the communication channels, the following sources of information are used by EMYs.

"I think media, maybe all social media is not useful for us because everything is in Estonian. That's why one day I decided to go (to show up) to the parliament [in person] for them to explain to me how the political system, in English." (Participant 2, FG II.3.)

"I got a lot of information from my Estonian language course, because the teacher was ordinarily interested in politics. A few times we read a newspaper, and we got information about events from this language course. " (Participant 1, FG II.3.)

"From ERR (Eesti Rahvusringhääling), cause I'm interested and I'm doing my internship at the parliament." (Participant 5, FG II.3.)

"I read newspapers in German and English, but those are always from the foreign perspective. There is always a barrier, from the foreign perspective Estonia is so digital, so advanced. This is always the German perspective. But I do not get the local news." (Participant 4, FG II.3.)

"In TalTech's incoming students' page, there is basic information for living, documents, visa, before you arrive here, and while you are." (Participant 3, FG II.3.)

"Expats in Estonia Facebook group. They post about multiple topics there." (Participant 5, FG II.3.)

"The welcoming programme 'Settle in Estonia', but there are multiple modules. It is also for free." (Participant 7, FG II.3.)

"I was googling events, and there was a page that would say what events there are during the year. But also, at the university, I would find out after talking to other people." (Participant 8, FG II.3.)

"A buddy system at the universities, but there are not many Estonian buddies." (Participant 1, FG II.3.)

Theme 4: The role of stakeholders

In discussing the role of stakeholders and what can be done to increase the possibility and levels of integration, the young politicians responded as follows.

"Maybe there should be some sort of mechanism for people from abroad and Estonians to get them talking. It helps a lot if you have a common event together, if you are at school together. Because by default, Estonians won't talk to you first... That's just how it is at the moment." (Participant 12, FG II.3.)

"As a political youth organization, we have a clear incentive to gain international contacts... Best we can do if you want to see Estonians is, we can always set up a meeting... But I agree that in the university campus it might be really difficult." (Participant 11, FG II.3.)

"If we are talking about concrete solutions... there should actually be a change in the Erasmus system; if we are paying billions for a system that is supposed to educate, to integrate... take part of that billion and apply it to the kind of experience that you share,

and build on it. And say that 'when you are coming to this country, these are the things that will help you get to know other people'. Student unions have tried to do this, but they have very limited resources.” (Participant 10, FG II.3.)

When asked about ways in which the country’s government would approach their integration endeavours in a better way, all EMYs, with the exception of a single one, said that they are not planning on or considering to stay in Estonia.

2.2.2 Second focus group (FG II.4.) (23/04/2020)

Theme 1: Participation of EMYs in Estonian political and social life and the role of stakeholders to support EMYs in this

In order to start the conversation, we inquired about the motivation and reason why the EMYs preferred Estonia as their destination. Most of them chose Estonia as a host-country because of it is internationally acknowledged digital state. This was pointed out as the main reason for all three (3) working EMYs. Another one, currently studying, mentioned as reason all the digital opportunities here and the possibility of getting a job and staying after completing the studies. The final one was interested more widely in the whole region and the political history of the Baltic States.

When discussing the preparedness of EMYs and their awareness about their host-country, Estonia, two thirds of the working EMYs were much better informed before starting their jobs here, while the rest of the studying EMYs relied on secondary online and printed sources.

“I was working for the PM-s office in digital transformation and was looking for more information... there was every week 1 article about Estonia, its e-Governance... I was getting more and more interested and decided to come” (Participant 1, FG II.4.)

“I prepared myself with Youtube videos. I did not have any information before, but learned from them about Estonia and Baltic states...” (Participant 5, FG II.4.)

“I was reading an article in a magazine in Spain about digital development of Estonia and it seemed very interesting. I tried to find more information and decided to come.” (Participant 3, FG II.4.)

We asked about the information channels that EMYs use to get the information they need every day. Several of them pointed out different Facebook groups and other informal networks (friends, workmates). The participants also pointed out some problems and barriers related to the information they need as EMYs: language barrier and lack of information accessibility.

“I think this information for people who don't speak Estonian and Russian about everything that is not related to ‘Estonia being digital’ is not very much out there, like the kind of very hard to figure out. You know, what are the hot spots?, where do people hang out?, etc...” (Participant 2, FG II.4.)

“There not so much a lack of information, but it takes some time to find it. If you do some online search, you will find sufficient information.” (Participant 4, FG II.4.)

Some discussed solutions were social media groups, or, as Participant 2 affirmed, making more Estonian friends, from whom the information could be obtained. Nevertheless, a working EMY, who has been an expat in many places, also added that those problems are universal.

“... is not about Estonia, it's kind of a 'hard life' for expats everywhere that you have to find the information” (Participant 1, FG II.4.)

In regard to practical information for EMYs, one of the participants confirms that in official institutions, everything is easy for foreigners (e.g. applying for ID-card or registering in the municipality).

“It is easier than elsewhere and Estonia does a good job...” (Participant 4, FG II.4.)

Working EMYs are following or are interested in Estonian politics primarily due to their work. One of the studying EMYs also showed an increased level of interest as well. Being politically informed also provides other societal benefits.

“I have been an expat in many countries and always been interested in politics as I find that this reflects a lot about society” (Participant 1, FG II.4.)

One participant in particular has been more actively involved in Estonian politics than the others. He mentions that for some periods he has been very involved and up-to-date, for others, less.

“So when I did the traineeship part of my job was covering Estonian politics, so during that six or seven month period I was very interests and I was very much up-to-date. Since then I've lost some interest... With the rise of EKRE and the counter demonstration, and Kõigi Eesti [a civic movement], and all these kinds of things, those drew me back into politics. So recently, since the most recent parliamentary elections, I've gotten more interested again because of the worrying trend that I see in Estonian politics” (Participant 4, FG II.4.)

On the other hand, the political information non-Estonian speakers obtain might be filtered.

“...this information, at least [what] I get about local politics is... I get it through a filter. I'm not an Estonian or Russian speaker... So, I feel like maybe it is a little bit hard for me to form my own opinion because it's through some sort of a filter that they get it.” (Participant 2, FG II.4.)

EMYs mentioned the following information channels for Estonian politics: Eesti Rahvusringhääling (ERR) – Estonian Public Broadcasting, and newspapers (i.e. Postimees), which are translated via Google by the participants. But, for all other information, EMYs mostly get it from informal networks, universities, relocation programmes and FB groups.

“The first two times I came to Estonia to study in summer school, it was the universities, in that case it was the University of Tartu and the University of Tallinn. When I came here to actually live here, I got most of my information from the previous interns and trainees at the Dutch Embassy. I also got some helpful information from ‘Work in Estonia’, who pointed me towards A1 level language course which helped expand my Social Circle as well as well as give some, you know, rudimentary Estonian lessons. So those would be the biggest sources of information for me.” (Participant 4, FG II.4.)

“I have the same. I get the information basically from the university and I was [getting] somethings from ‘Settle in Estonia’... I get information from them.” (Participant 3, FG II.4.)

“I get information, a lot from courses at the university, at Tallinn University, because I am studying politics and social sciences... The other one is my social circle. Not so much from my own research.” (Participant 5, FG II.4.)

“For me it was very similar, to everything that was mentioned. Maybe ‘hobbies and interest’ groups.” (Participant 2, FG II.4.)

Commenting the role of formal institutions as university mobility centres or Erasmus student networks in the social and political integration of EMYs, most participants agreed that these organizations focus mostly on entertainment, not political or any other contexts.

“There is some help provided by such organizations. I was part of a club called ESN (Erasmus Student Network) and there we share information about like life is here.... but the level of political talk is almost zero we don't we don't discuss that and if you do I think you face some backlash.” (Participant 5, FG II.4.)

“These kinds of organizations help you a little, but I think the main thing that students get from them is entertainment. They don't really worry if they are getting introduced into the Estonian society.” (Participant 3, FG II.4.)

“I have the same feeling for ESN... It's more social, just to meet new people... And mostly international people I've met through there, not many Estonians.” (Participant 4, FG II.4.)

However, as one Participant 3 argues, and Participant 5 accedes, this is not the problem of stakeholders if students are not interested in integration.

“The problem is not about those organizations, but the students that are coming. Because most of the people that are coming, I think they are not interested in being part of this society. They're maybe Erasmus... they come here for 1 semester, half a year... they only want to have fun.” (Participant 3, FG II.4.)

In regard to personal civic or political engagement in Estonia, only one participant has some personal experiences. Another participant also attends a common event, but only with the music in mind. A studying EMY affirmed that the reason behind the lack of involvement is the lack of information about this kind of events.

“I attended Women's day March last year 19th of January, concert for Kõigi Eesti. Estonian World, online newspaper¹⁴, they are organized some political debates. I attended one before last local elections.” (Participant 4, FG II.4.)

“I also attended Kõigi Eesti Concert, but it was more because about the music and not for the political act... But it is also part of my job [at the Embassy], not to get involved in the political life.” (Participant 1, FG II.4.)

“Since I do not have any information about this kind of things, I have never gone.” (Participant 3, FG II.4.)

The most active participant admits that he has also considered joining some civic or political organisation/network/group in Estonia, but when he realized he will not be staying for long, he decided not to.

“I was considering about a year ago, but then I already knew that I was leaving Estonia in 1 year or so, and did not see then any point to be involved.” (Participant 4, FG II.4.)

¹⁴ <https://estonianworld.com/>

Theme 2: EU citizenship rights and political engagement opportunities for EMYs at the EU level.

As previously mentioned in the activity description, one EMY (Participant 2) left the FG because of a personal engagement. The FG now contained 2 working and 2 studying EMYs.

Except for one participant, all EMYs voted in the 2019 EP elections for their home-country candidates. Of those that voted, only one of them resided in the host-country at that time.

"It's not like I didn't want to vote for Estonian politics, because I feel like I could have. But, I just thought it was easier and...even if I'm interested in Estonian politics, I'm still French and more interested about the local and national politics..." (Participant 1, FG II.4.)

"I was in Spain when this election took place, and... I was voting for a Spanish [candidate], because for me it doesn't make sense... But I didn't know that if you are living here [in Estonia] you can vote for an Estonian candidate." (Participant 3, FG II.4.)

"I voted for in the local elections in Estonia, and I also voted in the European elections. But for the latter, I chose to have my voting ballot mailed to me from the Netherlands, and I then sent it back to the Netherlands... I voted for a Dutch European Parliamentary member." (Participant 4, FG II.4.)

Having presented a slide about the survey's positive attitude towards i-voting, we asked the participants their opinions on the topic.

"Online voting is a quite a thing nowadays [for young people]. Unfortunately I think it is harder to make older people believe in it, in terms of security and privacy... The situation in Estonia is very different because people are quite confident, they've got trust in this system, whereas in France and Germany it is not the case... due to concerns about vote secrecy and privacy. But I am a strong advocate of it." (Participant 1, FG II.4.)

"I agree with that [the previous comments], absolutely." (Participant 5, FG II.4.)

"I personally would have absolutely made use of it. This time, I had to have a ballot sent to my home address, I had to send it back. I mean it's not that much effort, but I would have definitely preferred voting over the internet. I do have to agree with my colleagues here... There was a talk about doing internet voting on local scale... in the Netherlands... but it was immediately shut down. The Dutch people are in no way ready for this kind of thing. But personally I would have used it." (Participant 4, FG II.4.)

"I've never had the experience of voting online. If I think about my country, I'm from the south of Spain, and most of the people living close to me are rural. And I think that in my country it is not possible yet, because most of the people do not have computers, most of the population is really old, so we don't have enough people to vote by internet to get it." (Participant 3, FG II.4.)

For such cases in individual countries, Participant 1 comments that "... we could add up the same strategy as in Estonia. There are still physical ballots but you can also vote online."

On the topic of awareness about the right to choose whether to vote for candidates from the host-country or home-country, Participant 3 had already established that it was not known to

be a possibility. Thus, when asked if not knowing this possibility would affect turnout, a participant responded.

“It is difficult to speculate but I would assume that this is indeed the case. That if you don’t know that you can vote for candidates from your home-country, or that you may choose not to take part because you feel you don’t know Estonian politics well enough. I was aware of it myself because I had to sign a paper saying ‘I will not vote in Estonia AND vote in the Netherlands’.... But I think if more people knew they could vote for their home countries, I would assume that participation goes up but I do not know for sure.” (Participant 4, FG II.4.)

Presenting a slide about survey results on the knowledge of the right to participate in local elections, the discussion shifted to who should contribute to such awareness-raising activities and how.

“It is even harder for local elections than for European elections, where there are European parties and you can follow their information in another language than Russian or Estonian. For local elections it is even harder to understand what is at stake and stuff, because of language and information issues... Last year there was a debate for national elections in English part of ‘Estonishing Events’. It would be nice to organize debates in English in Tallinn and in Tartu where most of expats are.” (Participant 1, FG II.4.)

“I have to agree with Participant 1... Whose responsibility is it? It is difficult to answer. I would suggest ESN (Erasmus Student Network), maybe publish something about this... the universities. If you go on Erasmus to University of Tallinn, you have introduction materials where information is provided. They might handout a leaflet of something similar; that would be helpful. The media. The reason why I voted in local elections in Estonia was that I went to event in English organised by Estonian World... But I would suggest having the universities, in particular, take this up.” (Participant 4, FG II.4.)

“I see it quite the same. I think it is difficult to get EMYs interested because sometimes they think they can’t help anything in local life, because they come here only for 1, 2, 3 years. But maybe the universities can do some activities to inform them about their opportunities in community life and to help them make a decision.” (Participant 3, FG II.4.)

Moving forward, the topic of the Citizens’ Initiative was brought up. The slide presented results that a majority of people are not aware of it. The participants were asked about this topic and the awareness of any other tools and opportunities that can influence policy making processes in the EP or at the EC.

“I know there’s the possibility to organize a referendum based on certain number of people [signatures] from certain number of member states. But my issue is that it is already pretty hard to influence national politics and to influence this big machine that is the EU, it is on another level... It is so hard to relate, so hard to do anything.” (Participant 1, FG II.4.)

“Yes, you need to have a more powerful parliament... What I understand there is a mechanism for citizens to initiate stuff and promote changes; but still there is this barrier that keeps us fully relating with the EU which is, perhaps, due to the weaker powers

Parliament has in comparison with higher hierarchy institutions like the Commission.” (Participant 5, FG II.4.)

“I was not personally aware of the European Citizen’s Initiative. I’m aware that you can reach out to your MEPs. I think it’s pretty difficult to influence Brussels... if you see that there are less and less people who are the members of political parties across Europe over the last fifty years. I know that for the Netherlands the membership of political parties has fallen off a cliff in the last decades. So people in general seem to be less inclined to involve themselves actively in politics. So, it’s very difficult, I don’t have any suggestion as to how to turn that around, if afraid... Just now one of my colleagues mentioned an enlarged role of the European Parliament. It might help, especially the idea of European-wide parties. They exist already, but I’m not aware that they have any seats in the Parliament. But if there were some sort of Grand Europe-wide party, that might help as well, rather than voting along national lines. I know that they exist already but they haven’t much success.” (Participant 4, FG II.4.)

The final discussion point asked the participants for any recommendations or remarks on this theme.

“Participant 3 mentioned that there is more interest towards entertainment. People tend to ignore ways of including themselves in the larger society and instead they choose to hang amongst their kind. My recommendation to expand participation is to break down this sense of being just ‘Spanish’ and to hang out with, for example, with ‘Belgians’ or ‘Finns’. This could help me to think out of box and start participating outside of my circle, my bubble, feeling this community that the European Union is.” (Participant 5, FG II.4.)

“From my point of view, most of the people in Spain feel that Europe is on another level and not a lot of people are involved with Europe... I think I miss when I was in school more information more knowledge about the European culture. Because the first contact that I had with Europe was because of Erasmus and I was interested in different programmes that Europe offers me. But most of my friends are not interested about Europe, they don’t really care. They think, Europe is giving us money... I miss [a] more cultural Europe.” (Participant 3, FG II.4.)

Theme 3: Experience as an EMY regarding the COVID-19 outbreak and the extraordinary measures in the EU member states

We held our online FG right in the middle of COVID-19 pandemic and Estonia had declared an Emergency situation and established strict measures and restrictions. All participants, except one, were still in Estonia. Therefore, as an icebreaker, we asked what their feelings were and how they felt about not being in their home-country during the outbreak of the pandemic. The general reaction of these participants was that they feel safe in Estonia.

“It mostly feels that normal life goes on as many people were used to work from home already before the crisis”. (Participant 2, FG II.4.)

EMYs from both France and Spain commented that actually they feel safer than in their home-country as the situation is much better than back home, and in this sense they feel as being home. In addition, the Erasmus student from Spain commented how much better the situation in Estonia is considering a lesser level of restrictions. On the other hand, the EMYs also pointed

out that it is still very frustrating to not know when they will be able to travel again and see their homes and families.

Most of the information about the recent developments regarding the pandemic and restrictions in Estonia was received from Universities (Erasmus coordinators), Embassies, and word of mouth.

"I got information from my Erasmus coordinator here in Estonia. But at the same time Spain was trying to contact me, but they were really lost... Most of the info I have is from the university. But I also always try to find by myself information." (Participant 4, FG II.4.)

"I've been receiving a lot of information from the Embassy and also from my university. A lot of information comes from my flatmates, they read stuff on the internet and share what they find out." (Participant 5, FG II.4.)

As there was a recent contagion cluster at one of the international dormitories of Tartu University (6 students were tested positive for COVID-19 after a party in the dormitory), we also tested our hypothesis that there might be a lack of information about the situation and restrictions. This proved to be wrong, as the participants argued this might not have been due to lack of information.

"COVID and rules are everywhere in media, people are just dumb". (Participant 4, FG II.4.)

"I know that in my dormitory there are people who are also going to parties etc. because the belief is that nothing happens to them." (Participant 3, FG II.4.)

It also appears that social media is mostly just entertainment and untrustworthy for EMYs.

"I barely trust social media. There is so much trustable information out there in Embassies, governments". (Participant 4, FG II.4.)

"...In situations like this, we cannot trust social media, it is just for entertainment." (Participant 1, FG II.4.)

As to the efficiency of this official information and concrete instructions about COVID-19, Participant 4 (who was in his home-country during FG II.4.) commented that he struggled getting the information about flights to his home.

The reflection of EMYs on how the European Union/Commission has dealt the crisis are quite honest and harsh, revealing how non-unified the EU shows itself and bringing out some concrete examples of tensions between member states.

"The EU is not leading [in this crisis], but acting after the countries. They are now involving [taking] many decision [that other] countries are implementing, but they were behind." (Participant 3, FG II.4.)

"Netherlands says we won't allow masks to be exported to Denmark and then Denmark says we close the borders with Sweden. The role of the EU in this sense is difficult because health is a national area where you can't really do so much; but having some sort of coordinating role overall, that's where I would see the EU being able to do a better job. ... I'm not sure National governments would allow them to do that even, but that is what it [the EU] is there for." (Participant 4, FG II.4.)

Moreover, Participant 4 also points out the division and tensions between external and internal politics; referring to his country, which, according to his words *"...has gotten ferocious backlash from Italy in particular and Spain for not being, for not having sufficient solidarity."*

Nevertheless participants agreed that this is a learning opportunity and we should probably not be so harsh assessing the EU's performance as this was a new and unprecedented situation.

"I assume that EU learns from this crisis. I think the EU will be better in dealing with other pandemics or other illnesses because of this experience. This was new to the EU and to a lot of member states to everyone, and so initially it was chaotic; now the EU is doing a better job and we'll learn from this." (Participant 4, FG II.4.)

"I think like a double-edged sword, like either [all this] helps usto be more together and more ... not federative, but like working [much] more together basically... or it could be like the opposite, and every nation state is getting more isolated..." (Participant 1, FG II.4.)

Due to the immense uncertainty at the moment, our participants were a bit worried how the crisis affects the future of mobility, EU citizenship and all mobility programmes.

"Depends when and how we will come out of this, but it might very strongly influence the Erasmus and all those programmes next year. I know many students who planned to go Erasmus next year, but now, [they] are not sure" (Participant 3, FG II.4.)

However, EMYs were also positive, constructive and ready to propose new ideas, including on how to integrate EMYs better.

"Everybody hopes that things will be the same as they were before, but maybe there is a need to find some other forms of mobility." (Participant 3, FG II.4.)

"If EMY gets a ID-card (and many international students do have this Estonian electronic ID-card), maybe it could be issued with short info with upcoming election dates and information, etc. And [by] also having an ID-card you can activate your e-mail address '____@____.ee'. and then 3-5 month before elections you can also get info about that." (Participant 4, FG II.4.)

2.3 Stakeholder Interviews

2.3.1 Interviews with political representatives (MEPs)

In particular, during the interviews the following topics were discussed: the role of the project target group during the last EP elections 2019, internet voting, participation barriers and the lack of harmonization of national election procedures; transnational parties, social media and communication channels, voting age and youth engagement. Also, not cross-cutting topics were mentioned during the interviews that were nevertheless significant and hence, are briefly outlined in this section. The abbreviations found in parentheses throughout this next section correspond to the first letters of the name and surname of the interviewed MEPs.

2.3.1.1 Cross-cutting themes

Project target group's role during the last EP elections

All interviewees outlined that the target group is small and marginal and, hence, it is not cost-effective neither rational to invest in any electoral campaigns for them. Neither of the interviewed MEPs tried to reach the target group. The levels of awareness regarding the actual numbers of potential voters is low.

One of the interviewees stressed that he/she has never thought about this segment of voters before and did not know about the statistics. He/she presumed there might be around hundreds or maybe a thousand of EU citizens. The difficulty to reach out to this group has also been mentioned – even though multiple electoral events were held at the universities, it was not feasible to separate the audience between Estonian students and those from the EU. Different meetings in different languages – Estonian, Russian, English – were held with the target audience specifying the language. There might be a probability that he/she might have reached some of the target group representatives, but without specific intention to do that. He/she mentioned he/she could have possibly done a video for this group of voters (MEP3).

I-voting

Except for the MEP2, all other MEPs support I-voting and its promotion at the EU level. However, they also believe that this is the issue that the member states (MS) should be dealing with on the national level and it cannot be forced from the outside (i.e. by the EU). It was outlined that most of the countries are conservative when it comes to election procedures and a lot depends on the country's general attitude towards innovations (MEP1). Also, the trust issue is at the core of I-voting – trust for one's country and one's government (MEP3). Furthermore, interviewees stated that Estonia should probably learn how to explain in an understandable way how I-voting works (it is always easier to understand how to count voting ballots on paper) and be able to respond to criticism by providing international expertise. People still think there is a lot of mystery in I-voting, even though the internet banking is similarly full of mysteries (MEP1, MEP3, MEP4).

Participation barriers and the lack of harmonization of national election procedures

Three interviewees state that ideally harmonization of the national election procedures would be a good development, but it is not realistic. The sovereignty of the states is important and

elections will remain in the competence of the MS. Countries usually do not tolerate when the electoral procedures are prescribed for them (MEP1, MEP3, MEP4). MEP2's party does not support joint regulations that MS have to adhere to.

During several interviews we had the opportunity to raise the awareness of the MEPs about the registration procedure for voting that the EU citizens have to face in Estonia. Two of interviewees acknowledged that the procedure is not user-friendly and should be improved, if possible (MEP1, MEP3). One of the interviewees heard about the registration problems of EU citizens and the fact that there is very little information about where to register and how to vote (MEP3). The language barrier was also mentioned during some interviews. Whereas one of the interviewees acknowledged the importance of the issue (MEP3), the other two stressed the individual responsibility of the person in finding the needed information, in getting acquainted with Estonian politics and political landscape (MEP1, MEP2). This was particularly outlined by the MEP2.

Transnational parties and candidate lists

All interviewees strongly oppose the idea of transnational parties and transnational electoral lists. According to them, candidates from small countries will not have any chance to win and such lists are not in the interests of Estonia. One interviewee also added:

"Shall we consider the interests of an Estonian voter (so that he would understand what are the political programmes, views, ideology) or we should consider those thousand or two thousand EU mobile young people who came to live in Estonia in order to make the elections more attractive and comfortable for them? The approach should be actually vice versa – if one talented young person from the EU is coming to live in Estonia, his motivation should be to integrate with the society, to socialize and to understand the political system." (MEP2)

Social media and communication channels

All interviewees agree that social media nowadays is the most effective channel to reach out to younger generations. MEP2 stressed the importance of this media channel for other age groups as well. It was also outlined that today one has to engage a popular person or an influencer among the youth in order to spread the message. This might have a much better impact rather than an abstract advertisement (MEP1). Another issue raised by one interviewee focused on the stronger communication of the EU about its achievements, rather than difficulties (e.g. roaming charges) (MEP4).

Voting age and youth engagement

The issue of lowering the voting age has been discussed in three interviews. The reflections are mixed. One of the interviewees stated that in general, the issue of voting age is too politicized and considered to be too important. The interviewee argued that 16-17-year-olds are not interested in the platform of any particular party neither in the ideologies of the parties; 16-year-olds generally do not think about politics. He/she did not see the reason behind lowering of voting age and the need to promote active participation - if the person wants to deal with politics he/she will find the way anyway; there are no barriers for this (MEP2). Three

interviewees stressed that even though in Estonia the lowering of age to 16 took place recently, this did not bring any drastic changes in youth participation (MEP1, MEP2, MEP3).

Youth participation in general has also been a topic of discussion with MEPs. It has been emphasized that youth participation is a universal problem in many countries nowadays. Brexit has been brought up as an example and as a result of youth not being engaged (MEP1, MEP3). The social and political activeness in the host-country also depends a lot on the general activeness of a young person back at home (MEP1, MEP3). A lot depends on the educational system and school is the key place where social and political activeness should be nurtured (MEP1). It is also important for the youth to be able to make conscious choice when voting (in contrast to emotional voting for parties that are simply different (MEP1).

2.3.1.2 Other topics

- **On national and EU identities:** people nowadays have many identities, one can feel connection with his town, his country and the EU at the same time; these identities do not have to compete with each other (MEP4).
- **On the importance of mobility:** the future brings even more mobility and multiculturalism (British or German people coming to Estonia should not become Estonians); mobile citizens who have travelled a lot, worked and lived in different countries can contribute much to the social discourse and to the formation of the public opinion and mitigating the increasing fears of incoming flow of foreigners (Estonia as an example). Focus should not be just on getting additional votes (MEP4).
- **On voting rights and the right to stand as candidate:** the right to stand as a candidate in the host-country is a bit confusing when it comes to EP elections; regarding local elections, this is probably more natural for someone who is living not permanently and can be engaged in the local life (MEP3); one can talk a lot about the right to stand as a candidate, but the reality is different. Every MS has different election systems: Estonia has an open list system and most other EU countries have a closed one. In case the citizen of another country gets a good position in the party, he might get elected eventually, but in the Estonian context this is impossible (MEP1).
- **On mobility programmes:** interviewees provided positive reflections; the greatest value is the opportunity and the life experience that the young person receives. Regarding integration difficulties, a lot of things depend on the person and how open is the person himself/herself. Also, the culture, the size of the city and other different features play their role. It is important for the youth to see the world in larger perspective, to travel and not stay in a “capsule” of their own city/district (MEP1, MEP3).
- **On practical vs citizenship values:** It is good that young people actually acknowledge the importance of the EU in travelling, they do see their future in the EU. There is no problem with the youth saying that they want to travel and study abroad first and not mentioning political participation as a primary thing (MEP3).

- **On EP elections in Estonia:** there is no connection between party politics and EP elections in Estonia. These are purely personal/individual elections because of the election system. Every candidate is doing his or her campaign on their own (MEP1, MEP4).

On voting topics: all topics can be interesting for the youth if you manage to present them in an interesting way. One cannot say that climate is an extraordinary topic, this is just a trend nowadays. In same way one can talk about security policy and make it an interesting topic. Also, the interest of the students and youth in general depends a lot on the environment that has been created at schools by its teachers (MEP1). Climate change and the environment were the main issues for the youth during EP elections (MEP3).

2.3.2 Interviews with other stakeholders

The common topic of all the interviews was the activities and programmes developed by the stakeholders to integrate the target group into the Estonia's society. These activities and programmes themselves were not shaped specifically towards EMYs. Nevertheless EMYs could be considered subcategories of their intended target groups.

2.3.2.1 Interview with the Liaison Office in Estonia of the Directorate-General for Communication of the European Parliament

Youth Engagement

The EP Liaison Office in Estonia is involved in community engagement through the communication and dissemination of initiatives such as:

- 'Thistimeiamvoting' campaign and platform: which has evolved into the together.eu¹⁵ platform. In the opinion of the EP Liaison Office, the perception of this platform was more sceptical in the Baltic States, for example, than in Germany. The people of Estonia do not want to enter their data anywhere, everyone is aware of data protection.
- Euroscola programme¹⁶: an EP youth programme for high school and vocational school students aged 16-19. During Euroscola Day, around 500 students from different European countries can experience one day in the European Parliament Chamber.
- European Youth Event (EYE)¹⁷: an event held in the European Parliament's hometown of Strasbourg, that brings together thousands of young people aged between 16 and 30 from across the European Union, allowing them to share and shape their ideas for Europe's future.

¹⁵ <https://together.eu/>

¹⁶ <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/euroscola>

¹⁷ <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/european-youth-event/en/home/welcome.html>

- New European Experience Center to be opened in Tallinn: aiming to bring the European Union closer to the people through interactive exhibitions, an upcoming role-playing area and various mobile aids. According to the EP Liaison Office they also plan to bring Latvian and Finnish school students

Perspective of Politics

The EP Liaison Office agrees that voting activity of EU citizens in other EU countries had always been rather low. Additionally, regarding to the youth in the EP, according to statistics, there are quite a few young members in the EP.

Communication Channels

The EP Liaison Office works closely with teachers, organizes seminars and distributes EU materials. Nevertheless, the Office in Estonia is more focused on the Estonian-speaking community, i.e. information is distributed in Estonian through social media. If an English speaker registers for an event, information will be provided in English. Currently, the EMYs are not in their focus groups.

Future Perspectives

For future improvements, the EP Liaison Office believes that at the primary level, information about the EU could be conveyed through specific topics (e.g. environment), and not just rely on information about the institutions. Additionally, future meetings of EMYs and Estonian youth (mixed group) could be organized with a MEP in cooperation with the bureau.

2.3.2.2 Interview with the Ministry of the Interior

As previously presented, the "Settle in Estonia" programme aims to promote the independent coping of new immigrants in Estonia by providing the necessary information. EU citizens participate in the programme together with other foreigners, but the content of the courses takes into account the different legal status of EU citizens from other foreigners.

Social media and communication channels

Along with the residence permit, new immigrants receive an invitation to a vocational adjustment programme from the Police and Border Guard Board (PBGB). This is repeated if the person renews the residence permit and has not yet participated in the programme. In addition, online media channels (official website¹⁸ and Facebook channel¹⁹) are used to inform the target group. These channels are managed by the Communication Department of the Ministry of the Interior.

Political rights of EU citizens

The basic module of the Programme introduces the rights deriving from EU citizenship, including the right to vote. The 2019 EP elections were not seen as a separate topic, but the

¹⁸ To access the official website please click [here](#).

¹⁹ To access the official Facebook channel please click [here](#).

topic may have been raised during the course discussion. Experience has shown that the issue of elections always deserves attention.

Additional societal goals

In addition to the cultural background, the programme also provides an overview of Estonian civil society and opportunities to actively participate in its activities. The concept of volunteering and the internet platform "Gateway for Volunteers"²⁰ have been introduced, through which opportunities for volunteering can be found. With the support from EU Social Fund, this platform has also been developed in Russian and English.

Evaluation of the Programme

Participants will be asked for their assessment of the lectures as well as the courses and topic modules. The grades are usually very good, especially for participants in Russian-language courses. English-speaking respondents make more specific observations. Evaluators are not differentiated between the EU and others.

Improvements to the Programme

The mid-term evaluation report of the Programme from last year highlights the low number of participants in the programme. One reason may be the dissemination of information through the PBGB, which alienates people from some countries, as well as the frequency and channels of information. The programme regulation is currently being amended.

Although the information dissemination network of the Programme is already numerous, it can be further expanded, for example by improving cooperation with universities. In cooperation with Narva College, students of this institution can currently accumulate credits for elective courses in the programme. The possibility of combining language studies with those required at universities will be discussed. The problem is some competition between the University Orientation Days and the Ministry of the Interior's adaptation programme.

Future perspective

The contract with the current training partner runs until the end of this year (2020). Negotiations are ongoing with the Ministry of Finance for further funding of the Programme. The necessity of the Programme is also confirmed by the current situation, in which the e-trainings take place to keep foreigners informed about what is happening in Estonia, including relevant changes in legislation.

2.3.2.3 Interview with the Tallinn University International Club (ESN TU IC)

Youth Engagement

ESN TU IC operates on a voluntary basis and deals with students who wish to join its activities. The programme offered by ESN TU IC is 80% recurring, 20% changing every year. Different types of events are organized, mostly offering entertainment or introducing Estonian culture, heritage, history, language and nature. As they say on their webpage: "*Our purpose is to*

²⁰ To access the platform please click [here](#).

*introduce Estonian culture and language, to learn more about other languages and nations, and also to meet new and exciting people!*²¹ The format of their events may vary – there are cinema nights, guided tours, joint dinners, language courses. Students have the opportunity to introduce their home country, language, culture and food. International students have joint events with Estonian students, where the experiences of exchange students are introduced to promote going to study in other countries. Tutoring is intense in language learning. The events are also organized in co-operation with other higher education institutions (EBS, TalTech etc.). However, responding to the big interest of students, they organize also trips to Finland (and Lapland) and to St. Petersburg.

ESN TU IC does not organize any kind of political or societal events, and this is also the official policy of the organization. Yet, as our interviewee referred, there is another unit in Tallinn University which also organizes many activities of political character - School of Governance, Law and Society of Tallinn University.²² ESN TU IC provides all kind of practical everyday information and helps students with the bureaucracy of registering, applying for ID-card, with contracts, etc. Graduate students are advised on employment contracts. The rest of the activities are related to socialization. Postgraduate students are more focused on their studies, while exchange students are actively interested in the events taking place. The main problems/complaints they receive are related to practical issues or sometimes about some professors, among others.

Integration

Our interviewee states that Erasmus students are not interested in being integrated as they stay for short period in the host country. However, long-term students are at least more motivated to learn the language. The fact that also many Estonian students are involved in the activities definitely helps EMYs to create closer relations and bonds with Estonia and Estonians, and come out of their „bubble“. Civic activism is also promoted by ESN TU IC – organizing Cleaning-up-the-Beach actions, visit to elderly homes, etc. In Cleaning-up-the-Beach action, a co-operation proposal was made to the Tallinn City Government, but the city was not interested.

Our interviewee also referred to one potential activity or obstacle they have faced. The School of Governance, Law and Society in collaboration with Estonian MEPs, organizes study tours to Brussels for students. Nevertheless, until now only Estonian students can apply and participate. Our respondent argues that EMYs should be also eligible and it might have positive effect on their EU and Estonian integration.

Additionally, students might be interested in finding a job, and working would contribute to integration. An internship fair takes place every year in cooperation with companies in February, but it is difficult to find professional work.

COVID-19 Crisis

It has been very hard and intense period for ESN TU IC as well. There were many information requests related to this unprecedented situation for international students as well. Despite the

²¹ Source: <https://www.esindus.ee/en/ic/>

²² See for more details <https://www.esindus.ee/en/civitas-en/>

social isolation and Estonian official decision that Universities will continue with distance learning until the end of this academic year, they try to keep the relation with international students using FB groups, online chats, etc. As to the longer-term influence and potential impact on EU mobility programmes etc. there are some worrying signals in the air. Our interviewee refers to an article which states:

“Some 65% of the students who are in Erasmus exchange programmes but subject to confinement measures do not yet know if they will keep or return the grant that was disbursed for their studies, while 7% said they will not get any, according to a report by the Erasmus Students Network (ESN).

According to the Student Exchanges in Times of Crisis, a research report on the impact of COVID-19 on student exchanges in Europe, almost two-thirds of respondents do not yet know what will happen with their grants and are trying to get information from universities or national authorities.”²³

However, in regard to bachelor or master level international students, Tallinn University is very flexible and it has been decided that those who get in and want to start studying in autumn, can do it online until the situation normalizes (i.e. the borders open, flight connections are re-established etc.).

²³ Source: <https://www.euractiv.com/section/economy-jobs/news/erasmus-students-in-limbo-about-losing-grants-from-covid-lockdown/>

2.4 Desk Analysis of Party Electoral Programmes

In order to answer to the research questions about the policy topics covered by the Estonian parties' electoral platforms, the infographics is presented in Figure 27. In the following, an attempt has been made to summarize the positions of Estonian political parties for the EP elections, starting with the topics that party platforms have reflected the most. The thoroughness of the election platform differs considerably by one party to another but even a short statement can illustrate the party's general position. Three of the parties represented in the EP - Social Democratic Party, Estonian Centre Party and Party *Isamaa*, have covered all policy categories under analysis. We also can't completely rule out the possibility that gaps displayed on Figure 27 might be at least partly due to the fact that we didn't succeed to identify parties' position from the text of the platform.

2.4.1 Cross-cutting topics

All Estonian parties have expressed their positions on the vision of the EU/member state sovereignty, democratic functioning of the EU and economic policy.

Vision of the EU/member state sovereignty. All parties stand for the EU as a union of member states. The main difference is how strongly and emotionally the position is presented. Equal treatment of small and large member states is also mentioned in the platforms. Estonian Conservative People's Party emphasizes this in particular, proposing equal representation of all member states in the European Parliament.

Democratic functioning of the EU. Most parties emphasize the importance of general democratic principles of the EU functioning such as openness, transparency and public involvement in decision-making processes. The need for closer cooperation between the EP and national parliaments is mentioned by Estonia 200. Estonian Greens find that EP should have the right of legislative initiative. Some parties warn against over-regulation and excessive bureaucracy.

Economic policy. In the economic policy positions, the classical left-right inclination is apparent - the center - left Social Democrats and the Center Party refer also to the social role of the economy, the right-wing Reform Party and Party *Isamaa* emphasize the importance of the free market. The support for innovation is noted by several political parties as well the need to develop transport connectivity and common energy union. The preference of the Conservative Peoples' Party (EKRE) is the EU that resembles historic Coal and Steel Community.

Current infographic provides an overview of the general statements of political parties regarding the policy areas under examination.

| Topic | Reform Party | Estonian Greens | Social Democratic Party | Biodiversity Party | Estonian Conservative People's Party | Estonia 200 | Estonian Centre Party | Party Isamaa |
|-------------------------------------|--------------|-----------------|-------------------------|--------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------|-----------------------|--------------|
| Electoral slogan | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Vision of the EU/MS sovereignty | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Fundamental rights/rule of law | ● | | ● | | ● | | ● | ● |
| Democratic functioning of the EU | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Climate change/environmental policy | ● | ● | ● | ● | | ● | ● | ● |
| Migration policy | ● | ● | ● | | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Education/youth policy | | ● | ● | | | ● | ● | ● |
| Digital EU | ● | | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Social policy | | ● | ● | | | | ● | ● |
| EU Budget/taxation | ● | ● | ● | | | | ● | ● |
| Economic policy | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Regional policy | ● | | ● | | | | ● | ● |
| Foreign and security policy | ● | | ● | | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Agriculture, food policy | | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Link to the party programme | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |

Figure 27 Infographics of the topics in the electoral platforms of Estonian political parties.

2.4.2 Predominantly presented topics

In terms of popularity (1 gap) the next cluster of policy topics consist of climate change/environmental policy, migration policy, digital EU and agriculture/food policy. We will also include to this group foreign and security policy which was addressed by all parties elected in the European Parliament, and Estonia 200.

Climate change/environmental policy. Generally, parties are of opinion that EU should take an active role fighting against climate change and preservation of nature. Different measures are proposed for reduction of the EU ecologic footprint: renewable energy sources, waste-free circular economy, organic food production, consumer education etc. Centre Party supports the idea of creating special fund for regions where use of non-renewable natural resources should be cut down on ecological grounds.

Migration policy. Migration has been a “hot topic” in the EU in recent years, which is also reflected in the parties’ electoral platforms. All parties are of the opinion that illegal migration should be stopped and the control of EU borders strengthened. For reduction of migration pressure the EU should work for peaceful conflict resolution and with the countries from which the migration originates. EKRE and Party *Isamaa* emphasize that immigration policy must

remain in the competence of the member states. Social Democrats are also of the same opinion.

Digital EU. Estonia's success as an e-state is also reflected in the election platforms of political parties. Parties expect that Estonia can set an example for the development of digital single market within the EU. Free movement of data as fifth basic freedom of the EU and the need for common cyber security are pointed out by Party Isamaa. EKRE stands against restriction of the freedom of expression on the internet.

Agriculture/food policy. Parties state that an unfair agricultural support system should be reformed - all farmers should be treated equally. Most of the parties emphasize the need for clean and healthy food.

Foreign and security policy. A majority of the parties find that importance of the EU on global scale should be increased. It means a more active role of the EU in peace processes and development cooperation. The prevailing position is that the EU's defence and security co-operation should be strengthened. Particularly, it is important is to have common policy towards Russia. EKRE is warning that the EU's defence policy must not aim to reduce NATO's capabilities or create a parallel system.

2.4.3 Partly overlooked topics

The rest of the policy topics under the scrutiny display 3 – 4 gaps in the party electoral platforms. These are fundamental rights/rule of law, education/youth policy, social policy, EU budget/taxation and regional policy.

Fundamental rights/rule of law. This issue is very broad and may be dealt from different angles. Party Isamaa is stressing the need to protect common European values, Reform Party is referring more specifically to the freedoms of the EU. Social democrats see the protection of human rights as a core task of the EU. The party is condemning hate speech and see a need to monitor violation of fundamental Community principles by member states. Two conservative parties –EKRE and Party Isamaa oppose any restriction of the freedom of expression.

Education/youth policy. For the purposes of current project this is the most interesting topic. All parties (5 out of 8) that have addressed the issue on their electoral platforms, support youth mobility in the EU. The Estonian Greens state that the funding of youth mobility need to increased, in order to provide more diverse education and to integrate Europe more at grassroots level. Social Democrats also want to expand the opportunities of academic mobility and promote the opportunities of young people to be able to enjoy all the rights and opportunities of EU citizens. The Centre Party supports the expansion of the Erasmus + student exchange programme to enhance integration between member states' higher education systems. Every student should have a real opportunity to study for at least half a year at an external college. Party *Isamaa* also supports broadening the scope of the Erasmus programme to young people, especially young people in vocational training.

Social Policy. The Social Democratic Party and Centre Party support the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights and harmonization of social standards in the EU. Party Isamaa finds that the social system must be designed so that every person who is able to work, can find employment and re-enter the labour market as soon as possible. Estonian Greens are aiming for a fairer and more uniform minimum income in all Member states.

EU budget/taxation. Only two parties have expressed ideas regarding important issue of the budget revenues. Social Democratic Party supports an autonomous EU budget that does not depend solely on contributions from the member states. The revenue from such a budget could come from pan-European taxes such as the tax on speculative financial transactions. The Estonian greens support the reform of tax system so that large corporations and Internet platforms are subject to the same requirements as small and medium-sized enterprises. As to the EU budgetary spending the proposal from the Reform Party is to give more resources for Europe's competitiveness, innovation and security. The need to reduce bureaucracy is also mentioned by the Reform Party and Party Isamaa.

Regional policy. Parties value harmonious development of all EU regions. The distribution of funds from the European Union Structural Funds must be based on the principles of unity and coherence, with continued special support for the EU's less developed countries. Good connectivity is required, funding of pan-European projects such as Rail Baltic should be maintained and possibly increased. Party Isamaa supports the use of EU funds for more even regional development of Estonia.

2.4.4 General Findings

There was no clear leading theme in the election campaign, although in several policy areas the views of the conservative Party *Isamaa* and especially Estonian Conservative People's Party differ from those of other parties.

All parties, with the exception of EKRE, support a strong EU that can succeed in global competition and ensure European security.

In election platforms, political parties do not deal separately with the issue of mobile EU citizens. However, this issue is reflected in education and youth policy category where parties express their positive attitude towards youth educational mobility.

3 Conclusions

This chapter will coalesce all the compiled data and attempt to provide conclusions on common topics. The data used in this chapter is part of the Deliverable 4.3. and the different post-election mapping and interaction activities, which have thoroughly been presented in the previous chapter. The first five subsections will present data under the established working assumptions and sub-assumptions (previously detailed in Deliverable 2.1.). Each sub-assumption will be supported by the assembled information. A sixth section will discuss other topics that have not been directly covered by the working assumptions. A final section will include a brief summary and a description of upcoming activities.

3.1 Political apathy

Deliverable 2.1. surmises that political apathy cannot be solely blamed for the decrease in voting turnout of younger generations. Throughout the undertaken activities, the assumption of a **general lack of interest in politics** has not been significant, but observed in some instances (Figure 7). There have been cases of specific political apathy toward a host-country's political affairs (as presented in Deliverable 4.3.), presumably because the studying youth have other priorities during the higher education exchanges, which being short term, do not impart a sense of long-term perspective to the participants (FG II.4.). Political stakeholders do not view this target group favourably and will not expend additional effort or resources without clearly proven results (FG II.3.). In the post-election survey, 38.4% of the respondents did not vote in the EP elections (Figure 6), and specifically, only 4.1% from the total of survey respondents (10.7% of those that did not vote) argued that the reason behind not voting was *"I have no interest in politics generally"* (Figure 7). Additionally, of all respondents, only 21% do not follow news and other sources / channels of information about the EU and about the host country (Figure 22). One of the top reasons explaining their choice was: *"I have no interest in politics generally."* The EP Liaison Office in Estonia has also stated that the voting activity of EU citizens in other EU countries had always been rather low, possibly underlying an indirect acknowledgement of political apathy. We are also aware that our mapping and interaction activities are likely to be affected by a selection bias since participants in this project are implicitly declaring an interest in joining the political discourse.

Throughout all the activities, no participant has ever demonstrated a **general lack of confidence in political process and institutions**, nor claimed that *"my vote does not matter"*. In fact, the existence of various specific political topics of interest as mentioned by the distinct target groups (Deliverable 4.3., FG II.3., Post-Election Survey, FG II.4.), further transforms the assumption of political apathy into an almost moot point. In the post-election survey, the most selected important topics (from a list of multiple answers) were 'Climate change/environmental policy', 'Education / youth policy', and 'Migration policy', and picked up by 54.8%, 37.0% and 28.8% of all respondents, respectively (Figure 15). The trend mirrors the conclusion of Deliverable 4.3., but FG II.3 presents other topics of interest in addition to the environmental concern: EU reforms, social work and digitalization efforts. How well are these topics undertaken by the various local political parties and MEPs will be discussed in section 3.4 Communication Deficits. However, the post-electoral survey recorded that 39.7% (Figure 20) and 28.8% (Figure 21) of all respondents would like to receive relevant, real-life evidence that their votes can make a difference in EU politics and in the local community, respectively. Such

evidence would encourage them to become more actively engaged in the political aspects of the EU and their host-countries.

3.2 Home-country bias

Home-country bias, as defined by Deliverable 2.1., consists of “*any attitudes of perceptions that reflect either a strong preference for the home-country, coupled with a lack of interest – or even distrust – in the cultural and political life of another country, such as the host-country, and/or the EU at large.*” Some categories of this bias have been strongly identified throughout the conducted activities, while others, not so much. A **general lack of interest in the EU** has not been associated to the participants of the mapping and interaction activities. In the post-election survey, 2.7% of the total respondents (7.1% of those that did not vote) argued that the reason behind not voting was “*I have no interest in EU politics / I only vote in (national) elections in my home-country*” (Figure 7). Nevertheless, when asked about their identity, they considered themselves citizens of the EU in different degrees (Figure 18). This refutes the assumption of a general lack of interest in the EU. On the other hand, the existence of people with a general lack of interest in the EU has been identified, through the following statement: “*But most of my friends are not interested about Europe, they don’t really care.*” (Participant 3, FG II.4.) We are aware that this may point, again, to a selection bias among our population of EMYs, which cannot be remedied, realistically, within the scope of this project but will have to be taken into careful consideration in the analysis.

Lack of confidence in the EU institutions has been recorded previously in Deliverable 4.3. It has also been identified in the activities of the post-election mapping and interaction activities, but not to the defined extent and context of “*my vote only matters in my home-country*”. Some of the comments reference the complicated political nature of the EU.

“So, this mixture of intergovernmental and democratic institutions is another barrier.” (Participant 5, FG II.3.)

“...But my issue is that it is already pretty hard to influence national politics and to influence this big machine that is the EU, it is on another level... It is so hard to relate, so hard to do anything.” (Participant 1, FG II.4.)

Others, on the other hand, demonstrate the lack of confidence and solidarity brought about the handling of the COVID-19 pandemic.

“The EU is not leading [in this crisis], but acting after the countries.” (Participant 3, FG II.4.)

“The role of the EU in this sense is difficult because health is a national area... but having some sort of coordinating role overall, that’s where I would see the EU being able to do a better job. ... I’m not sure National governments would allow them to do that even, but that is what it [the EU] is there for.” (Participant 4, FG II.4.)

Though, this being an unprecedented crisis, the participants of Focus Group II.4 agreed that it is a learning opportunity for everyone. Additionally, Participant 2 from Focus Group II.3 argued that “*We need to make the EU parliament more significant for the EU population.*” Participant 5 of Focus Group II.4 commented similarly that the EP should be given more powers and authority, because of its current lower hierarchical position in contrast to other EU institutions.

The **lack of confidence in effectiveness of EU policy-making** has been more prevalently communicated by the participants in the post-election activities, especially in the discussions about the European Citizens' Initiative. The requirement for one million signatures is both seen as positive and negative by the Focus Group II.3. participants. The former in order to filter out non-democratic ideas, and the latter, as a barrier for normal citizens to submit proposals. The feeling of not making a difference was indicated by survey respondents in Deliverable 4.3., but the exact statement of *"does not make a difference to me"* in regard to home-country bias, has not been recorded throughout this deliverable's activities.

Deliverable 4.3. concluded that participants associated the citizenship of the EU with practical issues, such as travel and education, much more than political engagement. The **lack of interest in host-country engagement**, specifically the absence of long-term perspective, has been echoed by the interviewed MEPs, the political youth that participated in Focus Group II.3. and EMY's from the focus groups and survey. At the time of the post-election survey, 83.6% of the respondents were not involved in any political, social or civic activity in their host-country (Figure 16). Specifically, only 8.2% from the total of survey respondents (9.8% of those that were not involved) argued that the reason behind their decision was due to the following statement *"I am not going to stay in my host-country for longer than my studies last and therefore don't want to devote my energy to local activism and participation"* (Figure 17). The reasons of the rest of the negative respondents included communication deficits and pragmatic arguments, which will be further explored in the following sections. The MEP interviews have disclosed the following statements *"16-year-olds generally do not think about politics"* and *"the social and political activeness in the host-country also depends a lot on the general activeness of a young person back at home."* There was a consensus among the political youth participants of FG II.3. on the fact that *"people are not generally interested in EU elections."* To target the youth as possible voters would translate to great efforts and to low, even non-existent, returns. The following participant also sums up the assumption subcategory:

"Because most of the people that are coming, I think they are not interested in being part of this society. They're maybe Erasmus... they come here for 1 semester, half a year... they only want to have fun." (Participant 3, FG II.4.)

In this same Focus Group, Participant 4 had been quite active in civic and political engagements in Estonia, but this decreased and stopped once he knew he would return to his home-country.

"I was considering about a year ago, but then I already knew that I was leaving Estonia in 1 year or so, and did not see then any point to be involved." (Participant 4, FG II.4.)

Finally, the **preference for home-country engagement**, due to either cultural bias or pragmatism, appears to be the most prevalent assumption subcategory among all the participants. In Deliverable 4.3., the majority of the survey respondents would have voted for a home-country candidate, and *"focus group discussions demonstrated similar results"*. In the post-election survey, 71% of the respondents were living outside their home-countries at the time of the 2019 EP elections, and of those, 38.5% voted for a home-country candidate, 13.5% for an Estonian candidate, and 48.0% did not vote (in relation to the total number of survey respondents, these percentages are equivalent to 27.4%, 9.6% and 34.2%, respectively) (Figure 8). From those that voted for a home-country candidate, 65% declared it was due to pragmatism or home-country bias, and the rest 35% due to various administrative, information and communication issues or deficits (in relation to the total number of survey respondents,

these percentages are equivalent to 17.8%, and 9.6%) (Figure 9). Both focus group discussions supported these results, presenting pragmatic reasons.

“I wouldn’t vote for an Estonian candidate, is because I know my candidate better... And let’s say you are not here for very long, it is very difficult for me to see what this person wants. So, I would rather vote for a German candidate.” (Participant 1, FG II.3.)

“It’s not like I didn’t want to vote for Estonian politics, because I feel like I could have. But, I just thought it was easier and...even if I’m interested in Estonian politics, I’m still French and more interested about the local and national politics...” (Participant 1, FG II.4.)

Additionally, of all respondents, only 21% do not follow news and other sources / channels of information about the EU and about the host country (Figure 22). One of the top reasons explaining their choice was: *“I am busy with my studies / work and don’t have sufficient time to devote myself to follow the political news.”*

3.3 Information deficits

The following working assumption deals with the lack of information, about the EU, its institutions and activities, as per the definition in Deliverable 2.1. A **general lack of knowledge about the EU** was not highly represented in Deliverable 4.3. Its findings indicated that a large majority were aware of the upcoming EP elections. On the other hand, the represented cases of not having enough information on where and when to vote, in both home- and host-countries, might indicate an indirect acknowledgement of the aforementioned sub-assumption. In the post-election survey, 8.2% of the total respondents (21.4% of those that did not vote) argued that the reason behind not voting was *“I would have voted if I had known about the EP Elections in time”* (Figure 7). This indicates that there was a high level of awareness regarding the EP elections. However, when asked about the European Citizens' Initiative, 54.8% of all post-election respondents had not heard about this instrument. The participants of Focus Group II.3. knew about this platform, and debated its signature requirement. On the other hand, a participant of Focus Group II.4. was not aware of the platform, while another one, had heard about the instrument, but did not know its name. Additionally, post-election survey results show a high level of lack of knowledge when it refers to EU-related platforms (Figure 19), and a focus group participant declared:

“I think I miss when I was in school more information more knowledge about the European culture. Because the first contact that I had with Europe was because of Erasmus and I was interested in different programmes that Europe offers me. But most of my friends are not interested about Europe, they don’t really care. They think, Europe is giving us money... I miss [a] more cultural Europe.” (Participant 3, FG II.4.)

From all this information, latent knowledge deficit about the EU is discernible, and that can be addressed in the policy recommendations.

The **lack of knowledge about citizen rights** refers specifically to the right to vote for a home- or host-country’s candidates in the EP, to stand as a candidate in the host-country, or to vote in the host’s local elections. The pre-election survey of Deliverable 4.3 reflected an awareness for the first two mentioned rights of 75% and 39%, respectively. In the post-election survey, the awareness of the right to vote for either home- or host-country candidates of the 38% of

the respondents that did not vote in the 2019 EP elections was shown to be 53.6% positive and 46.4% negative (Figure 12). The percentages for the awareness of the right to vote in local government elections in the host-country (asked of all respondents) were 68.5% positive, 30.1% negative, and the rest declined to answer (Figure 13). Participant 3 of FG II.4. was not aware of the right to vote for either the host- or home-country's candidates in the EP election, and in the same focus group a participant stated that such knowledge might possibly have an impact on turnout.

“That if you don’t know that you can vote for candidates from your home-country, or that you may choose not to take part because you feel you don’t know Estonian politics well enough. But I think if more people knew they could vote for their home countries, I would assume that participation goes up but I do not know for sure.” (Participant 4, FG II.4.)

On the other hand, the **lack of knowledge about specific requirements and voting procedures** has been represented in the post-election mapping and interaction activities. Deliverable 4.3. has collected some accounts of the barrier that is insufficient information on voting requirements and procedures. In the post-election survey, only two respondents that had voted had issues when casting votes. Of those, only one of them described the problem as being *“It was difficult to find adequate information on how to cast a vote.”* The MEPs have also stated that there have been cases when *“there is very little information about where to register and how to vote”* which might lead to a lack of the required knowledge for possible voters. Additionally, for the EP elections and the increased participation in EU-related political discussions, 12,3% and 13,7% of the respondents requested an improvement in the provision of the official information about voting dates, registration procedures and other formal requirements in their host- and home-countries, respectively (Figure 20). However, when asked about improvements to encourage young EU citizens living abroad to participate more frequently or actively in the political life of their host country, 50.6% of all respondents selected the option to *“Provide better official information about voting dates, registration procedures and other formal requirements to participate in local elections”* (Figure 21).

Finally, **lack of knowledge about host-country parties/candidates and politics** has been indicated in the past activities. Deliverable 4.3. has illustrated that its focus group participants had different levels of knowledge about the host-country politics. Focus Group II.4. has also revealed that even if the person contains a high level of knowledge about the host-country's politics, and/or has actively participated in the past in such activities, the home-country bias, due to pragmatism, prevails. Additionally, the post-election survey has also pointed out some latent lack of knowledge about host-country parties/candidates and politics. Of those that voted for a home-country party/candidate during the EP elections, 10.0% responded that *“I do not know / am not interested in the politics of my host country”*, 5.0.% stated that *“I wanted to vote in my host country but did not find sufficient information on host-country parties / candidates”* and an additional 5.0% said *“I didn’t know enough about Estonian politics”* (this represents 2.7%, 1.4% and 1.4% of all survey respondents) (Figure 9).

3.4 Communication deficits

Communication deficits are related to the stakeholders and environment in which our target groups find themselves. Opinions in the Focus Group II.4. have differed regarding the level of existence of information provided by stakeholders for events. For example:

*“Since I do not have any information about this kind of things, I have never gone.”
 (Participant 3, FG II.4.)*

However on the other hand:

“There not so much a lack of information, but it takes some time to find it. If you do some online search, you will find sufficient information.” (Participant 4, FG II.4.)

This seems to complement comments in Deliverable 4.3. that allude to the fact that the participants do not know how or where to find the information. With this in mind, it is important to investigate the other possible factors that might create barriers in the communication between stakeholders and our target groups. The **language barrier** is the first sub-assumption of the working assumptions (Deliverable 2.1.), and has been heavily reflected throughout the course of the project's activities. The findings of Deliverable 4.3. have illustrated that language *“was stressed as one of the crucial barriers that contributes to the feeling of not being able to make an informed choice.”* The language issue is additionally compounded by a failure of stakeholders to capture the target group's attention, which will be further discussed in an upcoming paragraph. The MEPs also acknowledged the importance of the issue, but some stressed the individual responsibility of the person searching for the information. Focus group participants also reacted on this topic and its impact on local politics and elections.

*“...this information, at least [what] I get about local politics is... I get it through a filter. I'm not an Estonian or Russian speaker... So, I feel like maybe it is a little bit hard for me to form my own opinion because it's through some sort of a filter that they get it.”
 (Participant 2, FG II.4.)*

“For local elections it is even harder to understand what is at stake and stuff, because of language and information issues... It would be nice to organize debates in English in Tallinn and in Tartu where most of expats are.” (Participant 1, FG II.4.)

The political youth during FG II.3. had admitted that *“events have been held in both Estonian and Russian, the latter due to the existing large Russian-speaking minority, but there is less interest to hold them in a third language.”* Additionally, the EP Liaison Office in Estonia is much more focused on distributing information to the Estonian-speaking community. Of those that voted for a home-country party/candidate during the EP elections, 10.0% responded that *“I do not understand the Estonian language well enough to follow the political discussion / campaign”* (this represents 2.7% of all survey respondents) (Figure 9). The language barrier was also the second most selected reason behind why survey respondents do not get involved in political, social or civic activities in their host country, corresponding to 46.0% of these non-participants (and equivalent to 38.4% of all survey respondents) (Figure 17).

Other cultural or social difficulties to engage with people or integrate in the host-county have not been significantly represented by a common topic. There have been statements, and some survey results, that could be further studied to understand the level of impact on the target groups. A young politician of FG II.3. stated:

“...Because by default, Estonians won't talk to you first... That's just how it is at the moment.” (Participant 12, FG II.3.)

Also, according to a participant of Focus Group II.4., the existing student unions mostly focus on engagement between internationals (i.e. the student unions do not differentiate between EU citizens and those from the rest of the world) , and do not attempt to integrate them in a functional way into the host-country's society:

“... I was part of a club called ESN (Erasmus Student Network) and there we share information about like life is here.... but the level of political talk is almost zero we don't we don't discuss that and if you do I think you face some backlash.” (Participant 5, FG II.4.)

“I have the same feeling for ESN... It's more social, just to meet new people... And mostly international people I've met through there, not many Estonians.” (Participant 4, FG II.4.)

The ESN TU IC, while providing some civic activism opportunities, specifically focuses on “introduc[ing] Estonian culture and language” and not on political or societal events. They also assert that “Erasmus students are not interested in being integrated as they stay for short period in the host country.” For those that stay longer, working would contribute to integration, “but it is difficult to find professional work”. The third most selected reason behind why survey respondents do not get involved in political, social or civic activities in their host country was “I have been living in my host country for too short a time to confidently interact and communicate with local activists.” This answer was selected by 37.7% of these non-participants, and is equivalent to 31.5% of all survey respondents (Figure 17). When prompted about possible improvements to encourage young EU citizens living abroad to participate more frequently or actively in the political life of the EU, 23.3% of all the respondents chose the option to “Encourage host-country parties and EP candidates to take an active interest in the interests / needs of foreign EU nationals living in the country”, and 17.8% requested “Encourage other stakeholders (e.g. student unions, trade unions) to pay more attention to the interests / needs of foreign EU nationals living in the country” (these choices were not mutually exclusive) (Figure 20). When prompted about possible improvements to encourage young EU citizens living abroad to participate more frequently or actively in the political life of their host-country, 45.2% of all the respondents chose the option to “Encourage local politicians and parties to take an active interest in the interests / needs of foreign EU nationals living in their community”, and an overwhelming 71.1% requested “Show me that, as a foreigner, I am welcome to participate in political and social life of the community” (these choices were not mutually exclusive) (Figure 21).

Communication channel mismatch has not been highly encountered. In fact, the findings present good use of communication channels by the stakeholders. Deliverable 4.3 identified the information channels that were used by Estonian candidates: Estonian political parties (60%) and Estonian news media (58%), Facebook (44%) and webpages of EU parliament and other EU institutions (33%). Of these, participants mostly identified Estonian (e.g. ERR) and foreign news media, and social media as the most preferable channels. In the post-election survey, participants explained that they received news through the following channels: (52.1%) newspapers (digital and print), (17.8%) television, (74.0%) media portals and news websites, and (58.9%) social media (Figure 23). Similarly, the participants of FG II.3. and FG II.4. also mentioned these channels, and additionally, the relocation programmes, universities and informal networks (word-of-mouth). All MEP interviewees agreed that social media nowadays

is the most effective channel to reach out to younger generations. However, the effectiveness of social media has been brought into question with the COVID-19 pandemic. In this case, social media is mostly just entertainment and untrustworthy for EMYs.

“I barely trust social media. There is so much trustable information out there in Embassies, governments”. (Participant 4, FG II.4.)

“ ..In situations like this, we cannot trust social media, it is just for entertainment.” (Participant 1, FG II.4.)

When prompted about possible improvements to encourage young EU citizens living abroad to participate more frequently or actively in the political life (of the EU and of the host-country), 35.6% of all the post-election survey respondents chose the option to *“Provide better and/or more relevant tools and communication channels to participate in EU politics (e.g. with a focus on topics that I really care about)”* (Figure 20) and 39.7% of all the post-election survey respondents chose the option to *“Provide better / more relevant tools and communication channels for me to participate in the local political and civic discussion (e.g. with a focus on the community that I am currently part of)”* (Figure 21). The survey also inquired where, and how, would our participants like to find information on how to participate in the political, social and civic life of their host country. The responses (Figure 24) of all survey respondents reflected (selecting multiple answers was possible):

(60.3%) Host-country national authorities' websites / publications

(60.3%) Dedicated portals or apps (e.g. for recently arrived EU citizens)

(43.8%) EU institutions' / agencies' websites

(39.7%) Student unions', trade unions', professional organisations' websites / publications

(39.7%) Social media groups

(16.4%) Student unions', trade unions', professional organisations' offices / helpdesks

Finally, the **failure to capture the target group's attention or failure to penetrate “filter bubbles”** has been acknowledged by the stakeholders themselves in the post-election mapping and interaction activities. The conversation in FG II.4. touched briefly upon the subject of possibility of lowering the voting age in Estonia. During the conversation, a political youth interviewee claimed to *“not see the reason behind lowering of voting age and the need to promote active participation - if the person wants to deal with politics he will find the way anyway; there are no barriers for this.”* While the topic of voting age is not relevant to this project, this comment regarding the lack of reason to promote active participation is indicative of this sub-assumption. During the FG II.3., when asked about ever considering the youth as voters, the young politicians answered as follows.

“All depends on what you expect the profit of the effort would be. So as long as you're putting resources, you expect a return, and if that's not coming, then that's a problem.” (Participant 11, FG II.3.)

“I do agree there is no market for these people. And in order to exploit that market, you would need a lot of resources, and then we would still need people that are interested in politics in the first place.” (Participant 10, FG II.3.)

Some aforementioned results of the post-election survey could indicate a latent failure to capture the target group's attention. Of all respondents, 72.6% followed the political parties' campaigns for the 2019 EP elections (Figure 14), and of all survey respondents, 35.6% stated that the political parties / candidates did *"Not sufficiently"* address their topics of interest (while only 2.7% claimed their topics were not addressed at all). When prompted about possible improvements to encourage young EU citizens living abroad to participate more frequently or actively in the political life of their host-country, 45.2% of all the respondents chose the option to *"Encourage local politicians and parties to take an active interest in the interests / needs of foreign EU nationals living in their community"*, and an overwhelming 71.1% requested *"Show me that, as a foreigner, I am welcome to participate in political and social life of the community"* (these choices were not mutually exclusive) (Figure 21). As such, it is possible to conclude that there is an existing unwillingness by stakeholders to attempt to engage, capture the attention, or penetrate the bubbles of EMYs.

3.5 Administrative barriers

The final working assumption deals with the administrative rules and procedures related to voter registration and the polling process (Deliverable 2.1.). Firstly, the **member-state's conditions for eligibility to vote or stand as a candidate** will be discussed. Every EU citizen has the right to vote and to stand as a candidate at elections to the European Parliament in the Member State in which he or she resides, under the same conditions as nationals of that State. Additionally, any EU national living in another EU country, has the right to vote and stand as a candidate in municipal elections in that country. As such, there is no mismatch between the conditions of a national and the ones for a foreign citizen from another EU country, which might create an entry barrier for the foreign EU citizen. Nevertheless, communication deficits and any of the previous factors might come in play, and thus impact political participation. When prompted about possible improvements to encourage young EU citizens living abroad to participate more frequently or actively in the political life of the EU, 13.7% of all the post-election survey respondents chose the option for the provision of *"better official information about voting dates, registration procedures and other formal requirements in their home country"*, while 12.3% chose the provision of *"better official information about voting dates, registration procedures and other formal requirements in my host country"* (Figure 20, these choices were not mutually exclusive). Similarly, possible improvements to encourage young EU citizens living abroad to participate more frequently or actively in the political life of their host country yielded a percentage of 50.7% of all the post-election survey respondents, which chose the option for the provision of *"...better official information about voting dates, registration procedures and other formal requirements to participate in local elections"* (Figure 21).

Secondly, the **member-state's formal requirements and procedures for voter registration** vary from country to country, and have been highly referenced throughout the project. Deliverable 4.3. presented the finding that registration procedures, including deadlines, are among the barriers that prevent or hinder participation in EP elections in Estonia. If the information deficits are compounded to that, participants will be affected.

"And information [about registration] was not really provided in a good way. If you did not search by yourself, and tried to find all the things you needed, no one will do it for

you. Even if you upload documents that you were abroad, they would not send you anything. So it was really difficult.” (Participant 3, FG II.3.)

Multiple MEP interviewees would support the harmonization of the national election procedures, but admit that it is not realistic since *“the sovereignty of the states is important and elections will remain in the competence of the member states.”* In the post-election survey, 38.4% of the respondents did not vote in the EP elections (Figure 6), and specifically (Figure 7):

8.2% from the total of survey respondents (21.4% of those that did not vote) argued that the reason behind not voting was *“I wanted to vote for a home-country party / candidate but I missed the deadline for registration.”*

4.1% from the total of survey respondents (10.7% of those that did not vote) argued that the reason behind not voting was *“I wanted to vote for a home-country party / candidate but it was too complicated to get registered.”*

1.4% from the total of survey respondents (3.6% of those that did not vote) argued that the reason behind not voting was *“I wanted to vote for a host-country party / candidate but I missed the deadline for registration.”*

When prompted about possible improvements to encourage young EU citizens living abroad to participate more frequently or actively in the political life of their host-country, 20.5% of all the post-election survey respondents chose the option for the provision of *“Improve[d] procedures for registering to vote / casting a vote in local elections”* (Figure 21). At the EU level, this translates into a 8.2% and 13,7% of all respondents requesting *“Improve[d] procedures for registering to vote / casting a vote in my host country”* and *“...home country”*, respectively (Figure 20).

Finally, **member-state implementation of the polling process** may also be either a barrier or an enabler. For example, in Italy the election regulation is too rigid for people residing outside of their election district, as stated by the following participants.

“The problem is that you can only vote at your hometown, and there is not the possibility to change your voting to another place... it was impossible for me to come back because the next day I had an exam.” (Participant 5, FG II.3.)

“I came back home for voting, but I know many people who could not come back. Because they would have had to pay a 200 euros ticket. It is a very big problem. It is very hard to voting in Italy, if you do not have money.” (Participant 3, FG II.3.)

Similar explanations were given by two post-election participants that did not vote in the EP elections (Figure 7). The first one from Portugal expressed as a reason *“[I] Lived very far from [the] voting place”*; and the second one from Czech Republic *“I was very busy at that time and to vote in Czechia it is necessary to vote at your home town (which is very small village with hard accessibility) or to create through long procedure a voter-pass. So I decided not to vote.”* Throughout the different project activities, Internet voting (I-voting or online voting) has been discussed. I-voting is a type of electronic voting (e-voting) that is predominately characteristic to Estonia. It allows individuals to vote online even if they are not physically located in the country. Deliverable 3.1. presented fairly positive attitudes and reactions toward I-voting. With the exception of a single MEPs, everyone else supports I-voting and its promotion at the EU level. A participant of FG II.3. shared his pragmatic opinion that it would be comfortable for

“...students that are studying far away from home”, but it might not work “...in particular with older people.” (Participant 5, FG II.3.) Similar responses were recorded in FG II.4.

“Online voting is a quite a thing nowadays [for young people]. Unfortunately I think it is harder to make older people believe in it, in terms of security and privacy... The situation in Estonia is very different because people are quite confident, they’ve got trust in this system, whereas in France and Germany it is not the case... due to concerns about vote secrecy and privacy. But I am a strong advocate of it.” (Participant 1, FG II.4.)

“I agree with that [the previous comments], absolutely.” (Participant 5, FG II.4.)

“I personally would have absolutely made use of it... The Dutch people are in no way ready for this kind of thing. But personally I would have used it.” (Participant 4, FG II.4.)

In the post-election survey, 61.6% of the respondents voted in the EP elections (Figure 6). Of those that voted, when prompted on the option of I-voting 13.3% used it and 2.2% didn’t, and if it had been available in the 2019 EP Elections, 75.6% replied affirmatively and 8.9% negatively, (in relation to the total number of survey respondents, these percentages are equivalent to 8.2%, 1.4%, 46.5%, and 5.5%, respectively) (Figure 10). Additionally, of those EMYs that had been in Estonia but did not vote, the majority of them knew about I-voting, and those that didn’t, confirmed that they would have more likely voted if they had known of this possibility (Figure 11). In conclusion, EMYs appear to view I-voting in a positive light.

3.6 Other topics

3.6.1 Social integration

The topic of social integration has not been directly addressed by the working assumptions. Deliverable 4.3. have presented the conclusions of a *“general lack of social integration”*, which is a precursor for political engagement and interest in host-country (i.e. Estonia) politics. Participants of focus groups of Deliverable 4.3. have stressed the importance of sport and cultural activities and the need to burst from the international bubbles they might be kept. Student unions *“do not seem to play significant role in either social or political integration of mobile students.”* In the stakeholder interviews held for this Deliverable 4.5. ESN TU IC has affirmed that they do not organize any kind of political or societal events, and this is also the official policy of the organization. On the other hand, the Ministry of the Interior, through their *“Settle in Estonia”* programme, provide an overview of Estonian civil society and opportunities to actively participate in its activities. They have also introduced a multilingual (i.e. Estonian, Russian, English) internet platform through which opportunities for volunteering can be found.

3.6.2 Stakeholders roles and integration recommendations

Throughout the activities, the input of the participants has been welcomed. In some of the activities, they have been directly asked about the role of stakeholders and about integration recommendations. The role of stakeholders had been widely discussed in both the pre- and post-election activities. In Deliverable 4.3. focus group participants have stressed that *“even though the student unions are viewed as the closest supporting structure to the student, this does not seem to apply to international students”* since they are not able to be part of their structure due to time and language barriers. The political youth in FG II.3. have commented

that “there should be some sort of mechanism for people from abroad and Estonians to get them talking” (Participant 12, FG II.3.). However they agreed that “...in the university campus it might be really difficult” (Participant 11, FG II.3.) and that “[s]tudent unions have tried to do this, but they have very limited resources” (Participant 10, FG II.3.). Focus group II.4. participants also agreed that organizations such as university mobility centres or Erasmus student networks focus mostly on entertainment, no political or any other contexts.

The post-election survey asked all the respondents who could best provide them with relevant information about EU-level engagement (Figure 25). The top three selections were the EU institutions / agencies themselves (54.8%), and the host- and home-country authorities (47.9% and 45.2% respectively). Similarly, they were asked the same but this time focusing on relevant information about host-country (i.e. Estonia) level engagement (Figure 26). The top three selections were the local and national authorities themselves (53.4% and 47.9% respectively), followed by the EU institutions / agencies (45.2%). Focus group II.4. also explored the possible responsible stakeholders for awareness-raising activities at the local level:

“Whose responsibility is it? It is difficult to answer. I would suggest ESN (Erasmus Student Network), maybe publish something about this... the universities. If you go on Erasmus to University of Tallinn, you have introduction materials where information is provided. They might handout a leaflet of something similar; that would be helpful. The media. The reason why I voted in local elections in Estonia was that I went to event in English organised by Estonian World... But I would suggest having the universities, in particular, take this up.” (Participant 4, FG II.4.)

“I see it quite the same... But maybe the universities can do some activities to inform them about their opportunities in community life and to help them make a decision.” (Participant 3, FG II.4.)

A more direct integration recommendation was voiced in FG II.4.

“If EMY gets a ID-card (and many international students do have this Estonian electronic ID-card), maybe it could be issued with short info with upcoming election dates and information, etc. And [by] also having an ID-card you can activate your e-mail address ‘____@____.ee’. and then 3-5 month before elections you can also get info about that.” (Participant 4, FG II.4.)

The stakeholders themselves have brainstormed a few ideas. The EP Liaison Office believes that at the primary level, information about the EU could be conveyed through specific topics (e.g. environment), and not just rely on information about the institutions. Additionally, future meetings between EMYs and Estonian youth (mixed group) could be organized with a MEP in cooperation with the bureau. The Ministry of the Interior confirmed that negotiations are ongoing for further funding of the “Settle in Estonia” Programme. The necessity of this programme is also confirmed by the current situation, in which the e-trainings take place to keep foreigners informed about what is happening in Estonia, including relevant changes in legislation.

3.7 Summary and future activities

Deliverable 4.5 presents the implementation process and the findings of the mapping and interaction activities undertaken after the 2019 EP elections in Estonia. It describes the conduct of the post-election survey, two focus groups with the direct beneficiaries of the project and

multiple interviews with stakeholders. Also, the report at hand provided insights from the findings from the survey and the focus groups highlighting the important statements and arguments. A comparative analysis of the mapping and interaction activities undertaken in Estonia and Austria will be presented in Deliverable 2.3.

The summary of preliminary findings are structured along the five working assumptions (and their sub-assumptions) described in Deliverable 2.1. and other common topics that were discussed: 1) political; 2) home-country bias; 3) information deficits; 4) communication deficits 5) administrative barriers; and 6) social integration, stakeholder roles and integration recommendations. The individual in-depth explorations and summaries of these topics can be found in the aforementioned sections, in this third chapter of Deliverable 4.5.

During forthcoming project activities, a comparative analysis of the mapping activities undertaken in Estonia and Austria will be presented in Deliverable 2.3. The same deliverable will contain the validation of Estonian and Austrian results, which will be held on 10/06/2020 through a crowdsourcing online event. The main objectives of such an event is the validation of results of the pre-and post-election mapping and interaction activities (surveys, focus-groups, interviews) conducted in Austria and Estonia and the collection of input for Policy Recommendations (to be completed as task 4.6 in the project and presented as Deliverable 4.6). To achieve this primary objectives, the findings of analysis will be presented and participants will be asked about their reflections and views on the highlighted topics.

A joint crowdsourcing event serves as a forum for interaction between the mobile youth in Estonia and Austria, and supports creativity and the presentation of “out of box” ideas. The format of the event will be a webinar, where the basic findings of the project are presented followed by open moderated online discussion which allows participants to freely exchange views and voice opinions on these topics and questions. The event will be lead by one moderator, two presenters (one from Estonia and one from Austria) and will attempt to engage 5 participants from each country (for a total of 10 EMYs).

Finally, Deliverable 4.6. will capitalise on the results of interaction activities to draft policy and practice recommendations for the improvement of political engagement of mobile students as EU citizens.

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Annexes

Annex 1. Invitation to FGII.3

Annex 2. Invitation to FGII.4 and Post-election Survey

Annex 3. Re-Invitation to FGII.4

Annex 4. Survey Estonia Version

Annex 5. Participants FGII.3 (restrictive access)

Annex 6. Registrations and Participants FGII.4 (restrictive access)

Annex 7. PPT Presentation for FGII.3

Annex 8. PPT Presentation for FGII.4

Annex 9. Stakeholders Interviewed (restrictive access)

Annex 10. Desk Analysis Excel Table