Priit Vinkel: What 2025 taught us about elections, technology, and trust

News January 7, 2026

Written by Priit Vinkel, Senior Expert at eGA, former Head of Estonian State Electoral Office

2025 marked a significant year for elections globally, featuring over 60 national contests that examined the relationship between technology, security, and public confidence. As digital tools become more embedded in electoral processes, a central question emerges: how does the way we use election technology influence trust in the results themselves? Let us take a closer look at the recent elections in Albania, Kyrgyzstan, Germany, Canada, Moldova, and Estonia.

Technology delivers when transparency is built in

Countries expanded their use of election technology, but outcomes varied.

Albania: Electronic Voter ID and biometric de-duplication were used for a second time in general elections. 95% of polling stations were positively assessed, yet limited public disclosure of system testing put pressure on overall confidence. (Learn more: OSCE/ODIHR EOM Final Report)
Kyrgyzstan: The new biometric and ballot-printing systems functioned technically well; however, awarding the contract to supply the systems without a public tender process eroded the overall integrity of the technology. (Learn more: OSCE/ODIHR EOM SPFC Report)

These cases illustrate that, when it comes to overall trust, transparent and auditable processes before, during, and after elections often matter more than the technology itself.

Low-tech methods continue to deliver

Some countries continue with analogue systems, and it works well for them:

Germany: Paper ballots and hand counting were quick and seamless. Turnout reached 82.5%. This was the highest in decades. Broad acceptance of the results followed. (Learn more: OSCE/ODIHR EAM Final Report)
Canada: Paper ballots and post-election audits continued at the federal level. Registration and results transmission were digitised. Digital solutions are common at the local level. (Learn more: OSCE/ODIHR NAM Report)

Hence, digitalisation is not essential for successful elections if a country’s voters prefer clarity and verifiability over faster processes and technological advancements.

AI shifts election risk from systems to perception

While voting machines and IT systems were one facet of election trust, 2025 also confronted a more insidious challenge: the information sphere around elections, supercharged by artificial intelligence (AI). As these digital tools evolved, so did the threats: AI-powered disinformation exploded in 2025. Generative AI enabled malicious actors to produce deepfake videos, synthetic voice messages, and countless automated social media posts at minimal cost.

Canada’s 2025 election offers a telling example that echoed also across many other electoral contexts in 2025. A dispute between the government and a tech company led to a ban on news links ahead of the polls, creating information vacuums often filled by AI-generated videos and synthetic audio. Disinformation, frequently linked to foreign interference, has become a significant operational risk. Authorities responded with rapid communication teams and cybersecurity units. (Learn more: Digital Forensics Research Lab Case Study)

These national experiences reflect a broader international pattern. The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s 2025 report highlighted digital threats, disinformation and online manipulation as growing dangers to democratic elections. Reviewing elections in Romania, Albania, Moldova, and Kyrgyzstan, the report warned that voters increasingly struggle to distinguish reliable information from fabricated content. In such conditions, genuine political debate risks being overwhelmed by manufactured noise. Taken together, these developments underscore a critical shift: technical security measures are insufficient if voters distrust what they see or hear during campaigns.

Estonia: Building trust over decades

Estonia’s two decades of experience with Internet voting illustrate that trust in digital elections can’t be created overnight. It is the result of long-term investment and institutional continuity, rather than a single technological breakthrough.

Estonia’s digital voting system has evolved steadily alongside its broader digital identity ecosystem. For years, the ID card and Mobile ID were used as digital identity measures. In 2025, a third eID variant, the SmartID, was introduced, and 54% of all voters used this method in these elections. Additionally, the new mobile voting feature was successfully piloted in May 2025.

What is particularly striking is how familiar Internet voting has become for citizens. Close to half of voters continue to use Internet Voting, also in local elections, with minimal controversy. That confidence rests on a clear set of principles that have remained consistent over time: mandatory digital ID, voter-verifiable voting, independent audit opportunities, clear fallback rules, and continuous open public communication. Together, these elements create predictability, a key ingredient of trust.

Importantly, the Estonian Information System Authority no longer sees hacking as the primary risk, but disinformation and the gradual erosion of public trust as Alo Heinla, Head of RIA’s Election Technology Department, noted. This assessment mirrors broader international trends observed in the 2025 elections.

Estonia’s experience points to a more general lesson: secure digital voting is not a product that can be deployed quickly. It depends on sustained national commitment, a mature digital ecosystem, and institutions capable of maintaining trust as technologies evolve.

Moldova: Resilience amid hybrid attacks

Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections were held amid unprecedented cyber threats. Over 1,000 cyberattacks on government digital infrastructure were recorded ahead of the vote, and a large-scale assault on election day forced authorities to block a central hosting platform, knocking some 4,000 websites offline. Election authorities introduced a new risk-based cybersecurity framework, which helped strengthen the country’s digital resilience. As a result, key election systems withstood the foreign hacking attempts and coordinated disinformation campaigns aimed at undermining public confidence. (Learn more: OSCE/ODIHR EOM SPFC Report 2025)

Moldova’s experience also highlights the importance of sustained investment in cybersecurity beyond the election period itself. Over several years, EU-funded programmes have supported the development of national cyber resilience through institutional strengthening, capacity-building, and close cooperation with Moldovan authorities. Within this broader ecosystem of support, the e-Governance Academy has contributed to strengthening cybersecurity frameworks and operational readiness, alongside national institutions and other international partners. Together, these long-term efforts have helped create the conditions in which critical election systems were better prepared to withstand cyber threats.

Quantum computing risk: From theory to awareness

Quantum computing did not disrupt elections in 2025, yet, but it changed how we perceive future planning. Experts increasingly warn that many of today’s encryption methods may not withstand future quantum capabilities. Digital identity systems and Internet voting, both of which rely on cryptographic integrity, must now be designed with a far longer horizon in mind.

In response, post-quantum cryptography standards are already under development, with direct relevance for election technologies. (Cyber Security in Estonia 2025)

As a result, election security planning is no longer confined to electoral cycles, forcing governments to prepare today for risks that may only fully materialise tomorrow.

Takeaways for 2026 and beyond regarding trust in elections

Below are five key takeaways in the context of electoral management on how to maintain trust in elections in 2026 and beyond.

Design transparency into election technology. As election-management solutions grow more complex and digitally integrated, transparency mechanisms need to advance accordingly to facilitate public oversight. This involves not only making technical documentation and audit reports public but also actively involving citizens and observers in understanding system operations and how their integrity is preserved.
Treat disinformation response as core election infrastructure. In an age where AI-produced content can quickly mislead the public, it is equally essential to have mechanisms to identify, counter, and address false information, much like safeguarding ballot boxes or voter data. Election Management Bodies must prioritise information integrity as a vital operational area, establishing dedicated teams, protocols, and collaborations before, during, and after elections.
Prioritise cybersecurity in election planning.As elections become more digital, the surge of cyberattacks seen in 2025 shows that protecting election IT systems is as crucial as safeguarding ballot boxes. Cybersecurity should be treated as core infrastructure (e.g., implementing rigorous threat monitoring, defence mechanisms, and rapid-response protocols) to secure the vote and uphold public trust.
Invest today in future-proofing election security. As quantum computing and advanced AI develop, the security assumptions supporting current election technologies might become outdated. Governments need to invest now in research, standards, and upgrades to safeguard the integrity of democratic participation against future threats.
Strengthen citizens’ digital skills and awareness. Trust in digital components in elections also depends on people’s ability to understand and confidently use public digital services. Governments should invest in digital literacy, public communication, and user support to ensure inclusive and informed participation.

Altogether, as elections become more digital, trust depends less on innovation itself and more on visibility, governance, accountability, and public understanding. Technology can support democratic processes, but only when it is governed in ways that people can see, question, and ultimately trust.

Success Factors of Digital Election

Secure and Verifiable Technology. Digital election systems rely on trusted digital identity, strong cybersecurity, and practical verifiability so results can be independently checked. Systems must be resilient, auditable, and designed with long-term risks in mind, including cryptographic evolution.
Institutional Governance. You need a clear legal basis that defines responsibilities, oversight, and accountability across institutions and vendors. Governance structures must enable lawful decision-making before, during, and after the election.
Transparency and Observation. A public source code, observable procedures, access for independent observers across all election phases, and transparent disclosure during incidents support confidence and informed scrutiny.
Information Integrity and Crisis Response. Disinformation and technical incidents affect voter trust in similar ways and must be addressed through coordinated response mechanisms. Clear, timely public communication reduces uncertainty and limits manipulation.
Cybersecurity Frameworks and Operational Readiness
Voter Capability, Inclusion, and Agency. Voters need digital skills support, accessible interfaces, and clear communication to participate confidently. Digital options must expand choice while preserving non-digital alternatives and voter autonomy.